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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA-A (M) (30 Aug 71)

FOR OT-UT -713030

24 September 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
Delta Regional Assistance Command, Period 15 January 1970
thru 14 May 1971 (U)

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(10) Hal D. McCown

1. Reference: AR 1-26, dated 4 November 1966, subject, Senior Officer
Debriefing Report. (U)

(11) 14 May 71

2. Transmitted herewith is the report of MG Hal D. McCown, subject as
above.

(12) 91p

3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized
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as

Verne L. Bowers
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Major General, USA
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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375**

AVHDO-DO

1 JUL 1971

**SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report -
MG Hal D. McCown**

**Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310**

1. Inclosed are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by MG Hal D. McCown. The report covers the period 15 Jan 70 thru 14 May 71 during which time MG McCown served as Commanding General, Delta Regional Assistance Command.
2. MG McCown is recommended as a guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as (Trip)
2 cys w/d HQ DA

[Signature]
GEDDES, F. MACLAREN
CPT. INF.
Acting Asst Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
 DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
 APO 96215



14 May 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Commanding General
 United States Army Vietnam
 ATTN: AVHGC-DST
 APO 96375

1. References:

- a. Army Regulation 1-26.
- b. USARV Regulation 1-3.
- c. Senior Officer Debriefing Report, 1 June 1969 - 14 January 1970;
 Major General R. Wetherill, dated 14 January 1970.

2. To preclude repetition of historical fact and discussion, I have limited my attached report to an updating of reference 1. c. based on developments since my assumption of command on 15 January 1970. In the remainder of this cover letter, I will discuss what I consider to be the major areas toward improvement of the Vietnamization program in the Delta.

3. Personnel:

Leadership remains a central problem but has clearly improved. Overall, I consider the current crop of leaders in MR4 from battalion and district upward to be the best at any time during my tenure. Lower level leaders remain spotty with greatest weakness in territorial forces. Our objective in regard to key leaders has been to motivate the good, upgrade the mediocre, and remove the hopeless. Our success in replacement of incompetents has improved significantly since the arrival of Major General Ngo Quang Truong, Commanding General, MR4 in August 1970. The Prime Minister's Office needs to upgrade its selection

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14 May 1971

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process for new district chiefs. Two recent nominations are disastrous examples: an inexperienced quartermaster captain was named as district chief of tough Tri Tan District. In the second instance, a captain was assigned to command a district with three majors already on board. These officers suffered embarrassment and pacification slowed until suitable replacements were made available. MG Truong's impact on his subordinate leaders has been evident and profound. His dedication, professionalism and integrity render him a unique example to both military and civil leaders and staffs at all levels. His wholehearted support of my efforts in the sensitive matters of drug eradication, crushed rock and POL pilferage are examples of his courage and principle. His concern for the individual soldier and junior officer together with their dependents has resulted in improved morale and better treatment by mid level leaders.

4. Training:

a. Training at IV Corps training centers has improved. Lack of combat experienced cadre is the most serious problem in the National Training Centers. There has been substantial improvement in the quality of training offered by the division training centers and various "mobile training teams". Three programs employing this latter concept within MR4 are:

(1) Mobile Combat Training Team (MCTT):

The MCTT incorporates a systematic program of training-while-doing at the platoon and company level, employing a combined US and ARVN team. Training emphasizes small unit tactics, in particular, night ambushes and day reconnaissance-in-force operations. Each MCTT has four US personnel (two officers, two NCO's) and four ARVN from the unit to be trained (two officers, two NCO's). The goal of the MCTT program is to have two teams per regiment, a total of six for each division, by 30 June 1971. In conjunction with the formation of the MCTT's, this headquarters has developed bilingual procedure handbooks to enable ARVN personnel to employ US air assets without the assistance of US advisory personnel at the battalion level. As each battalion attains proficiency in air/ground procedures, its combat assistance team is withdrawn. A target date of 31 May 1971 has been set for completion of this training phase.

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(2) Mobile Training Teams (MTT):

This is a Vietnamese program which provides fifteen man territorial force training teams for each province. The teams travel among the villages and hamlets, training the local Popular Force platoons, and emphasizing techniques associated with their security missions.

(3) Night Operations Advisory Training:

This program utilizes the Australian advisory teams within MR4. The teams evaluate night training at selected districts within each province and establish a two week training program for RF/PF platoon and squad leaders. Each province selects thirty men per training cycle who, upon completion of the training, are tasked to pass on their newly acquired skills to other personnel within their own units. Additionally, the Australian teams conduct training at the district level, visiting local units and stressing techniques associated with night operations.

b. Through specifically tailored programs such as these, quality training is available to all units without lessening their availability for combat missions. Furthermore, a spirit of independence is fostered within Vietnamese units as they become increasingly aware of their ability to perform in combat without advisory presence.

5. Operations:

a. Upon assumption of command, I noted two serious problems that existed concerning the conduct of friendly operations: first, friendly initiated contacts with the enemy were extremely low considering the number of operations being conducted, and second, effective night operations were virtually non-existent.

b. During my tenure, I have directed advisory personnel and have encouraged the Commanding General, MR4, to take positive steps to improve performance in these and other areas. An information system has been developed for disseminating command guidance on tactics (Commander's Combat Notes) and lessons learned/combat tips (Operational Bulletins). These publications are distributed to the lowest level. Where appropriate, these documents are translated and distributed through Vietnamese channels as well.

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c. Emphasis has been placed on the conduct of small unit operations to counter the progressive fragmentation of enemy forces. Platoon and squad size patrols, and day and night ambushes have shown improvement. These areas require continued emphasis. Although results from ambushes are encouraging, the percentage of ambushes resulting in contact still remains small when compared to the total number of ambushes conducted. There are too many instances of repetitive use of the same ambush site, early termination of night ambushes and failure to consider current intelligence in ambush planning.

d. We have improved the cordon and search as a technique for routing out the Viet Cong infrastructure. The application of a military dragnet is carefully coordinated with other government activities to cause minimum discomfort to innocent villagers. There are still deficiencies in the technique. For example, interrogation by lower level intelligence officials immediately following an operation is generally inadequate.

e. The allocation and proper utilization of air assets is a subject of continuous command interest. The following steps have resulted in improved helicopter employment in the Delta:

(1) Nightly DRAC command reviews to determine the allocation of air assets for the following day and to critique the current day's operations.

(2) A bi-monthly written analysis for each category of aircraft employment. For example, use of all assault packages are analyzed by considering: the number of landing zones, number of troops per LZ, contacts, and enemy eliminated. Comparisons and trends are noted. This analysis is distributed to US and Vietnamese key personnel down to province level.

(3) Airmobility seminars are held at least each month at the Divisions and the Special Tactical Zone to review, together with sector officials and aviation representatives, the employment of aviation assets at their levels.

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f. A major tactical innovation has been the institution of Corps-wide Dong Khoi (spontaneous uprising) campaigns. These operations employ the maximum available forces to strike designated enemy targets simultaneously throughout the region. Meticulous planning, thorough analysis of current intelligence, and exploitation of Hoi Chanh are employed. A Dong Khoi operation is normally of four days duration and is designed to place maximum pressure on the enemy's system and to preempt enemy high points. The technique is undergoing further refinement. The concept is not yet fully grasped by some of the leaders at the sub-sector and village levels. Planning has in many cases been superficial and the employment of forces has not yet reached desired levels (75%). While much remains to be done, there can be no doubt of the effectiveness of Dong Khoi. Improvement in technique and results has been noted after each operation. I view this development as one of the most successful concepts to evolve in Vietnam. It exploits the numerical superiority of GVN forces, coordinates these assets on specific targets and requires a minimum of helicopter support.

g. Another concept of significance in MR4 pacification strategy is the Mini-base Elimination Program. Literally hundreds of small bits of enemy territory dot the Delta generally containing some mines, booby traps, and bunkers affording safe havens for small groups of VC/VCI. Provinces plot the location of all mini-bases and time phase them for permanent elimination. Foliage is either burned or cut out by hand and the mines and bunkers destroyed. This program is building momentum.

h. As has often been stated throughout the history of this conflict, coordination of effort remains one of the most difficult problems. In the inter service arena, significant advances have been made in MR4. Operations CUU LONG II up the Mekong to Neak Long, the U'Minh Campaign, Solid Anchor and the convoy operations to Phnom Penh have shown a steadily improving professionalism and effectiveness in joint operations. VNAF operations although below US standards have gradually improved with some helicopter elements becoming operational ahead of schedule. Medevac support, while sub par in the past, has recently taken a quantum jump due to a cross training program with US medevac personnel. Inter service coordination has been enhanced by the complete objectivity of MG Truong who tends to ignore the color of a man's uniform and concentrate on the mission at hand.

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6. Logistics:

The Vietnamese logistical system is responsive to operational requirements. The equipment modernization program is largely completed with some shortfalls in radio sets, AN/PRC-25 and to a lesser degree tactical vehicles. Progress has been made in opening and maintaining lines of communication and in the maintenance and repair of airfields in MR4. The early removal of US engineer assets from the LOC program and the limited assets available for restoration of the secondary road system will adversely affect pacification momentum. Vietnamization of hospital facilities is a problem due to the sophisticated equipment for which the Vietnamese lack proper training. A training program is underway at the 3d Surgical Hospital which will facilitate the turnover of hospital facilities. Little progress has been made in the turnover of US operated stagefields. We are attempting to have ARVN staff and operate the stagefields with US assets. Major weaknesses in the supply system are the reluctance to take prompt follow-up action on supply requests, to promptly recover and evacuate battle field losses, and the inadequate utilization of wheel vehicles for cargo movement.

7. Situation in MR4:

a. IV Corps is capable of meeting and defeating the enemy military forces in the Delta. Perhaps the single most important factor which has spurred GVN successes within the past year has been the cross border operation in the spring of 1970. This operation, and subsequent Cambodian incursions, have disrupted the enemy's sea and overland resupply routes. The enemy has been forced to fragment his forces, seeking safe havens in the countryside, and living off the land. Overall enemy strength within the Delta has steadily declined.

b. We have concentrated the bulk of our main force effort on the elimination of the enemy's in-country base areas. Not only have we penetrated every major enemy stronghold, but we have built a series of outposts therein to establish permanent GVN presence in these formerly exclusive enemy sanctuaries. Most notable among these

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operations are the neutralization of the enemy stronghold in the Seven Mountains area by the 9th Division; the continuing thrust into the U Minh Forest by the 21st Division; the combined 7th Division and territorial forces efforts in Base Area 470 bordering Dinh Tuong and Kien Phong Provinces; and the large scale pacification campaign into the birthplace of the Viet Cong, Kien Hoa Province.

c. During the remainder of 1971, MR4 must upgrade and sophisticate the pacification effort in the rather extensive and populated area it has wrested from enemy control. Assuming a continued reasonable degree of stability in Cambodia, as well as political stability in Saigon, I am confident that MR4 will continue to make substantial progress in both the security and development areas.

1 Incl
Senior Officer
Debriefing Report



HAL D. McCOWN
Major General, USA
Commanding

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CONFIDENTIAL**DEBRIEFING REPORT**

Major General Hal D. McCown

15 January 1970 - 14 May 1971

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Annex A, Special Security Detachment Support (Distributed through Special Security Group Channels)

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Debriefing Report

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1. During the period 16 January 1970 to 15 May 1971, the strategy and tactics used by the enemy in MR4 have changed from operations involving large VC/NVA main force units to essentially a low level, protracted guerrilla and political war. From a campaign involving the infiltration of three NVA regiments and the organization of several new units in Cambodia, the 1971 Winter-Spring offensive has been planned as a campaign to disrupt the pacification program, secure rear base areas, consolidate political support of a cease-fire and establishment of a coalition government.
2. In January 1970, the enemy had positioned the NVA 1st Division Headquarters and the 88, 101D and 95A NVA regiments consisting of 12 battalions just across the border in Cambodia preparing to infiltrate the Delta. The effort was directed by COSVN Resolution 9, which emphasized the strategic importance of the Delta as the battlefield on which the war in the south would be won or lost. By March 1970, all three regiments had successfully completed their infiltration, though heavy casualties resulted from continuous contacts with friendly forces along the infiltration routes. With the overthrow of the Sihanouk government in April 1970 and subsequent ARVN cross border operations, the 101D NVA Regiment was returned to Cambodia where it has remained a threat to FANK forces, the Cambodian Government and ARVN operations against enemy sanctuaries.
3. In the Spring of 1970, the VC/NVA forces in the Delta were at their strongest since TET 1968. The enemy force structure consisted of 8 regiments with a total of 42 main force and 17 local force battalions, 7,500 rear service, 17,200 guerrillas and 34,000 VCI for a total of 78,500 troops.
4. The highest point of enemy activity for the year began on 31 March 1970 with a one week enemy-initiated incident total of 1,387, including a first night total of over 220 incidents. Most incidents were indirect fire attacks, harassments and small ground probes of troop positions and outposts. However, two significant incidents occurred in VC MR2. In Chau Doc Province, Chi Lang Training Center was the target of a 500-round mortar attack followed by a multi-battalion sapper and ground attack. Though ARVN casualties were significant, the attack was beaten off with considerable loss to the enemy forces involved. In Dinh Tuong Province, an ARVN 7th Division element at FSP Schroeder was overrun in an intense sapper-ground attack, resulting in heavy casualties to both sides.

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5. In May 1970, major operations into VC/NVA logistical bases and sanctuaries across the Cambodian border caused a series of major setbacks for the enemy forces in MR4. OPERATION ROCKCRUSHER beginning in the Parrot's Beak area and moving westward with OPERATION CUU LONG along the Mekong River and into Takeo and Kampot Provinces of Cambodia, ARVN troops disrupted supply organizations, destroyed caches and base installations, and inflicted heavy casualties on both rear service units and main force combat units whose mission was security of the border areas. Total enemy losses included 2,800 KIA, 3,827 weapons captured and 329 tons of supplies destroyed or captured. The loss of the logistical bases from which to infiltrate supplies, weapons and ammunition to combat units in VC MR2 and MR3 was a severe blow to the ability of the VC/NVA to sustain previous levels of activity.

6. The main supply routes to MR2 base areas, which are fed from the Ba Thu area near the Crow's Nest, and from the Parrot's Beak and which flow to the Dong Thap (470) Base Area, were cut. The D16 Transportation Battalion was nearly destroyed and the MR2 rear service organization thoroughly scattered. As a result, the Dong Thap 1 and 2 Regiments and the 88th Regiment were ordered to disperse into small groups and become self-sufficient in the acquisition of food, clothing, weapons and ammunition. Food and clothing could be obtained either voluntarily or by coercion from the residents of the area. Resupply of weapons required that many units convert from the Chinese-Soviet to US weapons systems captured from ARVN, RF and PF units by overrunning small outposts, often with the help of traitors who covertly became legal members of the platoon or company manning the outpost. Captured documents and interrogation of PW's and Hoi Chanh's indicate formal training centers have been established to train low-level VC now to Chieu Hoi without being discovered and therefore become legal.

7. Presently in VC MR2, elements of three regiments and many local force units have converted partially or completely to the US weapons system. In VC MR3, which is supplied from base areas farther to the west in Cambodia, the severe lack of supplies was not felt to the extent that it was in MR2. However, some units in the U Minh Forest were ordered to become self-sufficient in the procurement of food, though the supply of weapons and ammunition could continue from the stores of supplies which were evacuated back to the Kirirom Plateau before ARVN forces could cut evacuation routes during the cross-border operations.

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8. The wet season of 1970 was intended by the enemy to be a period of reduced activity during which an intensive effort would be made to rebuild the rear service structures, transportation units, and the province-controlled commo-liaison system. Combat units were to remain in their dispersed configurations and to conduct indirect fire attacks, harassments, attacks against outposts, propaganda and terror campaigns, and civilian proselyting in an effort to expend as few resources as possible while maintaining the maximum control over the population in the face of the successes of the GVN's pacification program.

9. Implementation of these programs had hardly begun before the GVN's intensive pacification effort started in September. The objectives of the campaign were to establish a permanent government presence and influence in the enemy base areas and to eliminate or greatly reduce his ability to plan and stage military or political activity from the areas. The Dong Thap (470), Giong Trom (490) and Song Trang (489) Base Areas were targeted by the 7th and 9th ARVN Divisions. The intensity and duration of these operations greatly hindered the efforts of the enemy to rebuild his logistical net and secure his lines of communication. In reaction to the ARVN operations, which combined efforts by all agencies of the GVN pacification program, enemy battalion and company size units split into platoon and squad size elements in an attempt to retain their marginal control of the population. At the same time, fragmenting their forces would allow exertion of military influence across as wide a population base as possible. As the GVN campaign continued, the presence and propaganda of the VC/NVA failed to influence significantly the population, and collection of taxes in the form of money, food, clothing, recovered ARVN ammunition and conscripted labor became more prevalent. concomitantly, incidents of terrorism against village and hamlet officials, functionaries of the GVN, members of military and para-military organizations and civilians who refused to cooperate with the VC have increased steadily.

10. In Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces, the VC military response to the pacification program was a series of limited high points, most of which were conducted by small units utilizing economy-of-force tactics. The main objective of these high points was a demonstration to the population that the VC still existed as a viable force capable of withstanding the efforts of the GVN and able to enforce its own policies.

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11. In Chau Doc Province, as part of the intensified pacification campaign, the 9th ARVN Division conducted operations against the That Son (400) Base Area in the Seven Mountains. Base Area 400 has long been a nearly impenetrable base from which operations against installations and units in Chau Doc Province were conducted. Further, it provided a secure stopping point in the infiltration of personnel and materiel from Cambodia to the U Minh Forest and other areas of MR3. The Seven Mountains served as a base area for the 273d VC Regiment until August 1969 as it moved from Tay Ninh to the U Minh. Subsequently, the 163 Regiment established control of the area where it remained until March 1971. Current indications are that the 163 is redeploying, possibly to the U Minh. The 101st Regiment also operated from the Seven Mountains from December 1969 until April 1970, when it was redeployed to Cambodia following the fall of the Sihanouk Government.

12. In MR3, the U Minh Forest historically has been the main base of operations in the Delta. It has protected the Headquarters VC MR3 and served as a training, recruiting and resupply base for two main force regiments and several independent battalions. The U Minh also serves as the rear base for the convoi-liaison supply routes which lead eastward to Ba Xuyen, Vinh Long and Vinh Binh Provinces, and supplies the other main force and local force units of VC MR3. Until December 1970, the U Minh had scarcely been penetrated by ARVN or territorial forces. Operations which had been conducted were small, of short duration and with little penetration into deep strongholds of the base areas. On 1 December 1970, the ARVN 21st Division began a large scale operation intended to eliminate enemy influence from the forest. The major opposition came from the D2 VC Regiment with support from the D1 Regiment, the 2311 and 2315 Artillery Battalions and the 2012 and 2014 Sapper Battalions.

13. According to PW's and ralliers from the units, the major successes of the operation have been the disruption of the rear service and transportation elements and the capturing of significant quantities of cached supplies and ammunition. From 1 December 1970, to 13 April 1971 a total of 2357 enemy have been eliminated as a result of the operation. In addition, over 30,000 refugees have fled the area, thus depriving the enemy combat forces the pool of civilians from which to conscript recruits and laborers. Numerous Hoi Chanh reports have indicated that main force units have been forced to become more self-sufficient with the establishment of production cells within the battalions to cultivate and harvest rice.

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14. Analysis of results indicates the enemy's major losses have been suffered by local forces and that a concerted effort is underway to reinforce with NVA forces. Infiltration of supplies from the sea has increased sharply. It is believed that the majority of the VC/NVA main force units have suffered only minor losses and that the enemy retains the capability to conduct limited objective multi-battalion ground attacks supported by rocket and mortar fire. The significance of the enemy's avoidance of contact appears to be an attempt to wait out the campaign until the beginning of the rainy season when the 21st Division might possibly withdraw. The enemy's most probable course of action will be to concentrate efforts on attacking new outposts, particularly those manned by territorial forces, and all manner of LOC interdiction. Ambushes and water sapper attacks against supply craft on key canals will also be emphasized.

15. Political and military events out-of-country since the Spring of 1970 will have an effect on the enemy intentions and capabilities in future months. The fall of the Sihanouk government, operations of FANK forces and cross-border incursions by ARVN troops will tend to divert NVA and Cambodian Communist resources away from GVN MR3 and MR4. In early 1970, the closing of the deep water port at Kom Pong Som seriously hindered the enemy's ability to resupply units in the Delta, while the recent ARVN operations in Laos could possibly have long range effects on logistical support of NVA units in both Cambodia and southern South Vietnam.

16. Significant structural changes have occurred which, even though relate specifically to Cambodia, are of importance to the Delta. According to recent reports, the VC/NVA, through COSVN, has divided Cambodia into five Communist political zones. The area adjacent to GVN MR4 is known as the Southwestern Zone. Communist control in the Southwestern Region has significantly increased through a new command and control structure capable of directing as many as five regiments.

17. The command organization, incorporating the 1st NVA Division, is being referred to as the Phuoc Long Group. A total of 22 combat battalions are now identified in the region. It appears that the current mission of the Phuoc Long Group is to interdict Cambodian lines of communication, primarily Route 4 from Kom Pong Som to Phnom Penh, and river traffic on the Mekong from Tan Chau to Phnom Penh.

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18. In summary, the general trend of enemy activity in the Delta during the coming months will continue to include harassment of GVN outposts and troop positions using economy-of-force tactics. Increased acts of selective terrorism of civilians who are strongly pro-GVN and who oppose the VC are evident. Both types of activity have shown a sharp rise in frequency and effectiveness during the first four months of 1971.

19. Additionally, the enemy will occasionally mass troops up to battalion size to conduct major terrorism assaults on poorly defended population centers in order to inflict significant casualties while limiting exposure of his own forces.

20. He will continue strong propaganda and proselyting efforts and to legalize cadre in order to improve his position and influence in the event a coalition government is accepted by the people of South Vietnam.

21. The enemy will attempt to keep his command, control and supply mechanisms intact and functioning, and to continue reinforcing his units with NVA replacements, especially in the U Minh Forest.

22. Finally, the enemy will increase the NVA/VC/Klrf control of the Cambodian countryside adjacent to GVN MR4.

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COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS OF ENEMY UNITS
January 1970 to May 1971

TYPE UNIT	JANUARY 1970	MAY 1970	1 MAY 1971
MR Headquarters	-----	-----	420
Div Headquarters	-----	1,750	-----
Regt Headquarters	3,050	2,750	1,560
MF Battalions	8,185	8,648	4,866
MF Companies	630	630	-----
LF Bns	2,640	2,320	2,352
LF Companies	4,040	3,805	3,686
Cbt Spt Bns	450	425	175
Cbt Svc Spt Bns	640	600	810
Administrative	8,000	7,500	6,800
Guerrillas	18,800	16,600	11,800
VCI	31,100	33,320	17,000
*Cambodian VC/NVA units	-----	-----	6,436
TOTAL STRENGTHS	76,445	78,418	57,425


Note: The Cambodian unit figures reflect the strength of all units operating in the newly formed Cambodian Communist Southwestern Zone.

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
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
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CONFIDENTIAL**SECTION II, GOVERNMENT****A. Organization****1. Status of Elected Province Government**

a. Decree No. 68/NV of 9 April 1965, provided for elected Province Councils with power to decide, "within the framework of policy and course of action of the government", certain stipulated matters. The primary purpose of the council is to advise the province chief on the desires and needs of the people. Fifteen of the sixteen provinces in IV Corps had elected councils.

b. On 5 March 1970, Law No. 002/70 was enacted calling for elections for Province Councils. One significant aspect of these elections was that the Province Councilmen were to be elected from constituencies, namely the district. This was recommended for two reasons. First, there were numerous complaints that the old councils, elected at-large province-wide, largely represented the province capitals only. And second, election by district would help to assure councilmanic representation of the Cambodian ethnic minority.

c. On Sunday 28 June 1970, elections were held for Province Councils throughout DRAC. Voter turnout in DRAC was 72.1%.

d. A new decree, No. 128-SL/NV dated 14 October 1970 was enacted which enhances the authority of the councils. The councils now have authority to approve projects, transfer concessions, etc. up to a total of 3,000,000\$VN.

e. Simultaneously with the enactment of No. 128, the Prime Minister also executed Arrete No. 944 ND/VN which set the salaries and allowances of Province Councilmen at 20,000\$VN/month, with the Chairman receiving 32,000\$VN. The latter figure approximates the salary and allowances of Province Chiefs.

f. Shortly after the new Province Councils were seated, the CPDC made available to those Councils a fund unearmarked but with ground rules relating to development purposes for which the fund could be used. For 1970 the fund varied from 7,000,000\$VN in Kien Tuong up to 33,500,000\$VN in An Giang. The Councils generally used their funds on numerous small projects throughout the province. In 1971 the Councils appear to be inclined to fewer and bigger projects than in 1970.

2. Upper House Elections*B-19***CONFIDENTIAL**

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a. Upper House elections were held on 30 August 1970 as planned. 1,410,570 voters went to the polls, representing 65.4% of the electorate.

b. Although only four enemy initiated incidents appeared to be directed against the elections held in MR4 from 0700-1600 hours on 30 August 1970, it is of interest to note that there were 54 incidents the night of 29/30 August and 64 the night of 30/31 August. This compares to a "normal" number of 20-26 incidents a night. The degree of support in the Delta for pro-administration GVN Senate slates provides an indication of the success of pacification and the growing effectiveness of the GVN.

3. Autonomous Cities

a. Within the structure of the Government of Vietnam, the district is only a decentralized area of the province, and the only level or type of government below province is the village. The problem is that the structure, authority, responsibility, etc. of the village is the same, regardless of the size or problem of the village. As of this time, the autonomous cities of My Tho, Can Tho, and Rach Gia have been created in the Delta. The cities have not yet been activated nor has a date been set for the election of the Municipal Councils.

b. The Province Chiefs have been named concurrently Mayors of their respective cities. There has been considerable opposition from the members of the GVN Civil Service, because they consider the cities to be sufficiently secure to permit the appointment of civilian mayors.

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5. Administrative Data:

a. Village/Hamlet Elections

Villages*	Total	Elected	Appointed	No Government
Jan 1970	740	678	52	10
Apr 1970	739	681	49	9
Jul 1970	739	688	45	6
Oct 1970	741	716	19	6
Jan 1971	752	725	15	12
Mar 1971	755	733	22	0
Hamlets*	Total	Elected	Appointed	No Government
Jan 1970	4265	3719	258	288
Apr 1970	4265	3728	253	284
Jul 1970	4237	3777	273	187
Oct 1970	4250	3834	251	165
Jan 1971	4244	3914	233	97
Mar 1971	4315	4017	205	93

*Note: Figures by RPDC/MR4

The totals for Village/Hamlets fluctuate as the need arises to redefine what constitutes a village or a hamlet based on the progress of pacification. In the "no government" category areas, there are few people. Over 90% of the population of the Delta live in areas with operating governments. The US advisory effort of constantly recommending that elections be held wherever possible has been successful. Of the 755 villages in the Delta, 733 have elected governments or 97.3% of the total. Of the 4315 hamlets of the Delta, 4017 have elected governments or 93.0% of the total. These elected governments act as a viable GVN influence to the local populace and serve to deny these areas to the insurgents.

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b. Training of Village/Hamlet Officials:

(1) Under the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan 1,941 local officials were to be trained at Vung Tau and 6,452 officials were to be trained in province. As of October 31, when the 1970 P&D Program was replaced by the Special Winter Campaign, 1,058 officials or 54.5% of the goal had been trained at Vung Tau and 5,590 officials or 86% of the goal had been trained in province.

(2) The proposed goals were not reached because they were based on a higher election turn-over than actually occurred. Also many of the province training centers did not begin operations until after 1 July and the 1970 P&D Plan ended two months early on 31 October to make way for the special winter campaign. The total trained during the two National Plans was 13,734 officials in province and 2,757 officials at Vung Tau.

(3) With the compressed time frames of National Plans, it was necessary to accelerate the training program to meet the projected goals. As such, the quality of training was sacrificed for quantity. However, the cumulative effect of training has increased the effectiveness of Village/Hamlet government. Evidence of the growing competence of Village/Hamlet officials is their ability to handle VSD projects. For instance, in 1969, the villages completed 4,710 projects out of 8,500 under way. In 1970, 10,111 VSD projects (of both 1969 and 1970 programs) were completed with only 2,402 carried forward into 1971.

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B. Political Development

1. The most potentially explosive and far-reaching political event was the promulgation of the Land to the Tiller Law, on March 26, 1970. The broad scale political and social consequences of this act lie in the future. While there is a great deal of hope for the final outcome, the political ledger remains fairly balanced at this point. Expected opposition on the part of landlords did occur, but the only organized protest came from a small, albeit vocal group of Hoa Hao. On the other hand many landlords have been aided by the fact that they are now to be compensated for land which previously was inaccessible to them. At the same time the new land owners express a heterogeneous attitude of gratitude and skepticism. The question is still what the feelings of the rural people will be toward the government which has gone so far to satisfy a presumably long and deeply felt need. A great deal no doubt hangs on the success of the measure. If the result is to truly enhance the livelihood of the former tenant, then there is every reason to be optimistic. If, on the other hand, the landlords are able to circumvent the intent, if petty corruption within the GVN frustrates the program as it has others, or if the new landholders, lacking financial resources to exploit their land, fall prey to creditors and eventually wind up as tenants again, the measure will not have achieved its goals, either politically or socially. With the steadily decreasing level of enemy activity in MR4, accompanied by the breakup of large VC units into smaller ones and the stress on the establishment of legal cadres in preparation for a coming political struggle, the need for security, formerly uppermost in the minds of most people, has been replaced in many areas with increasing concern over the economic situation. Rising commodity prices coupled most recently with a decline in the price of rice have combined to make people think that they are in bad straits today and, although when prodded they will admit that things are probably much better than they have been for a good many years, the economic situation remains an area of primary concern and attention for the GVN.

2. The continuing Village Self Development Program, the new Province Council development program, a second round of village and hamlet elections saw a delta wide voter turnout of 89% and Senate elections drew 66% of the population to the polls along with the government's continued exhortation for people's participation, have all aided in producing a higher level of political consciousness than existed three years ago. Yet this is a very slow process and in many areas the votes of entire villages are no doubt still auctioned en bloc to the highest bidder.

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3. One of the most significant developments over the last 18 months in the Delta has been the enhanced position of the Province Councils. Rejuvenated by new elections in August 1970, in which 72% of the populace voted, and a substantial amount of piasters to spend for provincial development, the Councils in many areas are asserting their prerogatives and assuming a far more active role than their predecessors. In some provinces the Councils have not only withstood pressure from province officials, but successfully opposed them, including the Province Chief, and in other areas the Councils were consulted in drawing up the Provincial Pacification and Development Plan. In addition, it now appears that the Councils are providing a spring board for candidacy for the Lower House.

4. Political development has been less than encouraging in the Delta. Religious and ethnic bodies, where group identity is the strongest, still dominates. A mere listing of parties existing in the Delta is misleading, for political activity occurs in a broader context.

5. If the Hoa Hao were united they could wield considerable power and command similar attention. As it is, both religious and secular political organizations are badly split and their strength seriously diluted. Nevertheless, by virtue of sheer numbers in the Delta, even the different Hoa Hao factions still retain various degrees of potency.

6. The Nhan Xa, a Catholic party with many former Can Lao members, remains relatively important in the Delta due to the number of former Can Lao people holding positions in the GVN and Catholic discipline and organization during elections.

7. Aside from these groups, the most interesting party, and certainly one with the potential to be a real comer, is the Progressive Nationalist Movement (PNM). Over the last 18 months, provincial committees have been established in two additional provinces (meaning at least 500 members and bringing the total provincial committees to 9 of 16 provinces), and it could probably be said that based on this the PNM remains one of the most active political parties in MR4.

8. Beyond this, most political party activity is moribund or nearly so. President Thieu's National Social Democratic Front is generally considered to be defunct. The Hiep faction of the VNQDD has established provincial committees in 10 of the 16 provinces, while the rival Khanh faction has only 3, yet there seems to be a good deal more appearance than substance and claims of strength are frequently fantasies rather than fact. The Movement for the Renaissance of the South (MRS) exists and has offices in 7 of the 16 provinces. The CVT's Farmer Worker Party has offices in only two provinces, yet with the backing of some Hoa Hao and the talents of the CVT, it could command widespread support in the future.

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9. In short, while the development of political parties still does not elicit elation, the slowly increasing level of political awareness on the part of the rural populace, the remodeling of institutions such as the province councils, increased security and freedom of movement, and the possible impact of the land reform bill all support the theme that things, politically speaking, have improved over the past 18 months.

10. GVN aims and consequently their policy toward the Khmer Krom (KK) have remained confused. On the one hand, the GVN expects the KK to accept full responsibilities as Vietnamese citizens, while on the other they are not prepared to take the necessary political action to integrate the KK into Vietnamese society. In response to demonstrations led by the Theravada Buddhist Association in 1969, a Directorate General for the Development of Vietnamese of Cambodian Origin was established in October of that year. Demonstrations demanding restoration of ethnic minority status by the Theravada group continued. The dramatic events following on the fall of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia diverted the attention of the KK for awhile.

11. With Sihanouk out of the way, the new Cambodian Government reversed the Prince's policy of accommodation toward the VC and NVA and moved against them. This brought about an improvement in Vietnamese-Cambodian relations and also a reduction in the usual friction between the GVN and KK. At the same time, the KK were put in a precarious position when the Cambodians began to persecute the Vietnamese living in Cambodia causing nearly 200,000 of them to flee to South Vietnam in fear of their lives. At the present time, the GVN and GKR are cooperating to the minimum extent desirable to defeat their common enemy. More than 15,000 KK, mostly former members of the Khmer Kampuchea Krom and the Khmer Serei, have been integrated into the Cambodian Army where their previous experiences and in some cases their superior training have been of inestimable help.

12. The KK are divided into two groups, the more radical Theravada Buddhist Association and the moderate Kemmaranikay Buddhist Association. The former is headquartered at Chantareangsay Temple in Saigon and draws its main support from among the KK in Vinh Binh Province. Senator Son Thai Nguyen is their lay spokesman and was responsible for getting the Senate to pass a bill restoring ethnic minority status to the KK in February 1970 despite earlier rejection of the bill by the Lower House. The Theravada Association belongs to the usually pro-government Quoc Tu Buddhist Association and the Theravada religious leader, the Venerable Lam Em, is also Grand Patriarch of the troubled Quoc Tu. Despite their association with Quoc Tu, the Thieu government has become disenchanted with the Theravada Association because the Association has been the leading sponsor of the demonstrations

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demanding ethnic minority status which President Thieu apparently continues to oppose. As a counter, the Government has encouraged and supported the formation of a rival moderate group the Kemmaranikay which has its main support in Ba Xuyen, Rach Gia and Chuong Thien as well as some support in Vinh Binh.

13. Despite their apparent differences, the two KK groups have enough in common to come together in the face of any serious mishandling of the KK by the government. Both groups agree in calling on the government to recognize the equality of the KK by appointing a few KK Province Chiefs, an effective Director General and a few senior civil servants. Further, they would like the government to remove the prohibition against Cambodian schools imposed in 1957 and subsidize the teaching of Cambodian as an additional language in the schools in areas inhabited by Cambodian speakers. Finally, the more modern and progressive KK would like confirmation of their right to follow their religion and traditions as well as special help to upgrade the teaching of Vietnamese in Cambodian speaking areas, and until that can be done some official action to permit KK children extra time or examination points to make up for the special problem they must face as a result of their language handicap.

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CONFIDENTIAL**C. Economic Influence and Land Reform**

1. Economic factors generally have favored the GVN in its counterinsurgency effort. Although the inflationary trend is harmful to those on fixed incomes, it has been advantageous to the farmer. This is noticeable in the Delta, for the rise in food prices has not been equalled by the rise in the cost of manufactured and processed items. With money in their pockets, farmers bought mechanized farm equipment in great quantities, have purchased motorcycles and boat motors, or made improvements on their houses, and are clamoring for electric power to run the appliances they wish to buy.

2. Towns people are also profiting. There has been a heavy investment in vertical construction. Many multi-story combination commercial-residential buildings have been built. Almost all the available skilled labor is working in the private sector. Government contracts are being largely shunned by contractors.

3. The Land-to-the-Tiller program has the potential to eliminate the grievance of the peasants regarding landlords. A liberal policy of rural loans is now needed. Past programs have been too small and too difficult for the average farmer. The current idea of Village Credit Committees making loans under VN\$50,000 is not yet understood by farmers or administrators. It is possible that Village Credit Committees will be able to provide the needed capital.

4. During the period covered by this report the Government of Vietnam (GVN) introduced a major innovation in farm policy. The "Land to the Tiller" law was passed in March 1970. With vigorous support from CORDS/DRAC Advisors at Province and Region, the GVN made dramatic progress with the "Land to the Tiller" (LTTT) Program and by May 1971 had achieved a respectable fraction of the results of all previous programs combined. (See tabulation in Annex A)

5. The significance of this achievement lies in the important effect which the pattern of land tenure has on political and economic development in an agricultural economy such as that of the Delta. When LTTT became law in 1970 roughly 60% of the riceland in Vietnam was farmed by tenants. Most cultivated a plot of one or two hectares (2.5 - 5.0 acres) and paid as rental up to 50% of their crops. The landlord gave nothing in return. The Viet Cong had long recognized the propaganda potential of these conditions, and exploited them to cause unrest and gain support for their insurgency.

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6. In recent years, the GVN has recognized the need for a reform in the land tenure system. Farmers who own their land have a stake in society, and tend to support the government, which recognizes and protects that stake and offers conditions under which free-hold farmers can advance themselves and their families.

7. The LTTT Program will transfer virtually all ricelands worked by tenants to the actual farmers, with former landlords being compensated directly by the government. All tenants are eligible, even those installed by the Viet Cong -- although the latter are eligible only as tillers, not because of their VC "title". Landlords are entitled to retain land worked by themselves directly or by paid farmhands, up to a limit of 15 hectares (37 acres) plus a certain amount of land devoted to the ancestor-worship cult. To achieve maximum effect the Land Reform effort aims at completing most of the title transference in three years. An estimated 1.3 million hectares (3.2 million acres) will be transferred, four-fifths of it in the Delta. From 4,000,000 to 6,000,000 individuals will be affected by this massive reform.

8. US Advisory channels are employed for transmission of documents and photomaps for the program, and US-furnished computer support at Saigon produces titles and records. This US support has improved the flow of documentation and accelerated the program by at least 50%, making the achievement of the three year goal fully feasible.

9. During the period of this report over 240,000 hectares of land were approved for transfer to tillers, in response to applications from more than 145,000 individuals. At the normal Delta wide average of 5 persons per farm family, over 725,000 persons benefitted from these transfers. Detailed achievements are shown on the following page.

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Land To The Tiller Achievements -- MR4*

(From effective initiation of the program to 15 May 1971)

Date Action	Program Results (Cumulative)		
	Applications affected	Applicants ^a affected	Area ^b (hectares)
Nov 70 ^c Applications approved	2,572	2,074	2,843
Titles Distributed	0	0	0
Dec Applications approved	44,818	39,110	61,956
70 Titles Distributed	3,555	3,225	5,715
Jan Applications approved	74,342	64,308	103,803
71 Titles Distributed	6,262	5,604	9,794
Feb Applications approved	107,223	91,729	152,075
71 Titles Distributed	19,642	17,449	27,908
Mar Applications approved	132,039	112,109	185,433
71 Titles Distributed	39,148	37,417	52,270
Apr Applications approved	161,113	136,220	226,592
71 ^d Titles Distributed	51,012	48,814	67,788
as of 15 May 1971 ^d			
Applications approved	175,650	148,276	247,171
Titles Distributed	56,944	54,512	75,547

Cumulative impact of all other Land Reform programs up to the beginning of 1970

Farmers benefitted	192,086
Hectares distributed	394,876

REMARKS:

*Source: AD/IR (USAID) bimonthly computer printout for months indicated.

a. An applicant may apply for any number of plots as long as their total area does not exceed 3 hectares.

b. One metric hectare = 10,000 sq. meters = 2.47 acres US.

c. From June to October, Village and Province Land Affairs Cadre were being trained to work in the program. November 1970 was the first month of full program operation.

d. Projected on the basis of all 1971 accomplishments to 31 March.

Annex A

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D. New Life Development Programs

1. The 1971 Village Self-Development Program is an improvement over the previous year's program in that a loan program was incorporated. While there were few changes in program implementation, the amount of money that the village government can approve for Category I project was increased from 100,000\$VN to 199,999\$VN and for Category II project (approved at the provincial level) increased to at least 200,001\$VN. The petty cash fund allowed at the village level remains 100,000\$VN. Program phases were reduced from 5 to 4.

2. As in 1970, the Province Mobile Guidance Team (previously known as the PMAT or Province Mobile Assistance Team) continues to operate more vigorously in the provinces to assist in problem-solving and in bringing the provincial government closer to the "riceroots".

3. Under the current program, the village government is given the option to decide whether a portion of the village funds may be allotted to income-producing projects or not. The Village Council can use its funds wholly for public-use projects but a maximum of 50% can be pre-empted for income-producing projects which are channeled through the Rural Development Loan Program. The Village Credit Committee oversees the loan program, but the ADB is the final approving authority. For its effort, the Village Credit Committee is given a share of 4% out of the 18% charged by the ADB to borrowers. Another 4% is for the village government and the remaining 10% is ADB's portion of the interest levied. If loans are paid on time, ADB promises to give additional bonuses to both the Village Credit Committee and the village government.

4. The maximum loan that may be granted to an individual is 50,000\$VN, no collateral is required, payable over a period of 12 months. Priority is given to individuals with no standing obligations with loan systems like the Farmer's Cooperatives, rural banks and the ADB itself. Only 1 person in each family can request a loan and the loan will be used for income-producing projects only.

5. Program Objectives:

a. To continue to assist in the development of an independent and responsive local government by further solidifying and strengthening organized groups (To Hop) capable of lending support and direction to village affairs.

b. To advise and assist in initiating development projects, planned and implemented by the people with local government support.

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c. To assist in the training of elected and appointed village officials in the proper implementation of the Village Self-Development Program.

d. To recruit and train Vietnamese Community Development Assistants (CDA's) who will help in the overall pacification and development program under the general supervision of Provincial Community Development Officers.

e. To help in harnessing local financial resources for economic development in rural and urban communities through people's participation in the Rural Development Loan Program.

f. To assist in monitoring the progress of the Village Self-Development Program.

6. People's Common Activity Group (To Hop):

a. A To Hop is a combination of families having the same aspirations and the same profession, aimed at achieving a project which is expected to increase family income, community facilities, and professional skills in order to bring about security and prosperity to the village.

b. Emphasis upon processes and procedures over the mere act of completing projects will still be the primary consideration this year, but like stress will be placed upon the development of local economic growth by offering individual incentives to residents via "soft loans" through the Rural Development Loan System. The end is to inspire formation of locally financed cooperatives that will eventually be the mainstay of the village economy.

7. Achievements:

a. There are at least 727 villages and majority of the hamlets in MR4 which are participating in the VSD Program.

b. A total of 10,111 VSD projects were completed in 1970 while another 2,402 have been carried forward this year for completion.

c. Approximately 11,000 village and hamlet officials and Village Credit Committee members were trained on the operation of the VSD program in various orientation and training seminars conducted at the province, district and village levels by members of the Province Mobile Guidance Teams (PMGT).

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d. Hired 40 additional Community Development Assistants who are now numbering to 150 in the Delta.

e. Conducted the following training and seminars:

- 2nd Orientation Training Course - 23 Mar - 4 Apr 70
- Workshop on VSD and Public Administration - 28 Jun - 1 Jul 70
- Land Reform Seminar and Special 1970 P&D Plan- 28 Jul 70
- Basic Supervisory Course and Office Management - 7 - 12 Dec 70

f. Published weekly and later monthly status of VSD funds and projects including Urban Development Program.

g. Conducted program surveys and inspections.

h. Utilization of the remaining 22 Community Development Officers as the principal advisors on the VSD Program

i. Encouraged Village Governments and Village Assemblies to join in the VSD-ADB financed Rural Development Loan Program in the economic development of the village.

j. Assisted in the GVN program exercises in 1970 and early April this year in the particular area of Village Self-Development.

8. Community Development Officers

a. There are 22 Community Development Officers remaining in MR4 after the reduction in force of 1970. Except for Go Cong, Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa with 2 Community Development Officers, the rest have only one each. They are under the direct supervision of Province Senior NLD Advisor.

b. Backstopping the provincial Community Development Officers is a staff of 3 assigned at the regional level with the Community Development Branch/NLD, assisted by 2 Vietnamese Area Development specialists and a secretary.

9. Community Development Assistants:

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a. Community Development Assistants (CDAs) in the Delta numbered 110 by the end of 1969. By the end of 1970, there were 150 working in the different provinces under the direct supervision of Community Development Officers or District Advisors. They have been trained on three occasions in Can Tho on the following courses: 1) Workshop on the VSD Program and Public Administration; 2) Land Reform and Special 1970 Pacification and Development Plan Orientation; and 3) Office Management and Basic Supervisory Course. The supervisory training lasted for 6 days and was conducted for selected Community Development Assistants who showed promise and potential as leaders.

10. Agriculture

a. Massive training efforts plus a ready supply of credit and physical inputs coupled with "miracle" varieties and improved security changed the rice situation in VN from deficit to self-sufficient. With a 3% increase in planted area and a 10% increase in yield in 1970-71 it is estimated that present stocks plus small additional imports already scheduled will be adequate. A normal break on weather in 1971-72 will put VN back in the surplus rice column. Continued efforts must of course be made to increase rice production efficiency and replace present varieties with those having better milling and eating qualities.

b. There has been a continuing study of the water resources utilization and control of the Mekong Delta. Several provinces have installed small irrigation projects and have completed plans for additional projects. These projects have had a definite influence on the cropping pattern within the project area and created incentive for additional projects.

c. With increased security and improved water control (salinity, flood, irrigation) MR4 farmers made first steps toward diversification. The most immediate and desirable step has been to use excess paddy and by-products in livestock and poultry feeding. The new program to produce feed grains is another step to diversify. These products can, after supplying the country's domestic needs, serve as foreign exchange earners through export trade. The rice station at My Tho was damaged badly during Tet 1968. This year the decision was reached to designate this as the major national field crop research and training center and planning was initiated to bring this about.

d. The feed grain program is in the developing stage. One CORDS Feed Grain Advisor and one Area Specialist are working full time on this project. To date there are four priority provinces in MR4 that have been selected to start the program, An Giang, Kien Giang, and Sa Dec. Marketing facilities are being promoted. The community grain depot concept is being pushed. This facility will act as collection

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point between local farmers and feed mills and will also sell farmers seed, fertilizer and farm tools.

e. More livestock and poultry are being produced in the Delta than ever before. This production was brought about by:

- Modern commercial hatcheries
- Purebred pig imports
- Improved animal health and sanitation practices
- Livestock producer training

The first modern hatchery was established in July 1969 in Can Tho. It was put into operation with a 300 capacity incubator. In 1970 the breeder flock was increased to 1,600 birds and a new modern 10,000 egg capacity incubator has been installed. Total capacity is now 16,000 eggs. A 10,000 egg capacity incubator in Chau Doc has been placed back into operation. A total of 121 gilts and 16 boars were distributed and paid for by private swine producers. From January to April 1970 an extension type livestock educational program was conducted in the 16 provinces of Region IV. Vaccine distribution has hit its all time high. Distribution in 1970 exceeded the 1969 amount of 630,000 doses by one hundred thousand doses. There has been a total of 345 vaccinators trained since April 25, 1970.

f. Increased hectares of TN Rice and supplemental Crops in 1970 resulted in increased fertilizer sales in the Delta. Of the 535,000 tons of fertilizer received in Vietnam during 1970 approximately 300,000 tons were distributed in the MR4 by farmer organizations and private dealers. This is an increase over the 265,000 tons in 1969. As hectares of TN Rice and feed grain are increased so will fertilizer use and sales increase.

g. The Agriculture Development Bank (ADB), an institution endowed with legal entity and financial autonomy, is contributing to the development of agriculture through out Region IV. To reach their objective ADB is carrying out banking services essential to agriculture growth. 1970 saw a sharp increase of ADB activity with loans of VN\$1,773,705,857 to 60,977 farmers of which 24,398 received loans for the first time. Production loans were 55% and agriculture business loans were 45% of the amount loaned. Collections were made from 48,182 people in the amount of VN\$1,207,581,893. Many of these collections were reloaned for production needs. The Village Pacification Loan Program initiated late 1970 will provide additional sources of credit to small farmers through village credit committees.

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h. The three Rural Banks in Region IV have had a full year's operation and are furnishing an additional source of agriculture credit. 1970 shows 2,617 agriculture loans for VN\$137,848,000. Collections of VN\$54,288,000. The Rural Bank in Kien Giang was opened in January 1971. Three more will be opened during the first six months of 1971.

i. During 1970 many of the Farmer Organizations evaluated their activities and functions. Several have shown increased sales of machinery, pesticides, seeds, fertilizer and other commodities needed by their members. Sorghum and the feed grain program in Region IV will offer the active organizations and private enterprise an opportunity to develop feed mills to produce and market mixed feeds essential to increase livestock production.

11. Construction

a. From January 1970 to 15 May 1971, twenty-six USAID/CORDS funded construction projects were started in MR4 and twenty-two completed. The total value of the completed projects is equivalent to US\$2,329,144. The buildings or structures were very valuable additions:

- to the VN public health system (one Province hospital, several province medical warehouses, etc.)
- to the VN public education system (three technical high schools, etc.)
- to the VN public safety system (NP training center under construction).

b. The Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) approved and funded forty-three construction projects in MR4 for 1970, with a total value of VN\$82,320,000 and sixty-six construction projects for 1971 with a total value of VN\$158,451,000. These structures included public health buildings (Maternity Dispensaries, Maternity Infirmary Dispensaries, Village Dispensaries, etc.), educational buildings (elementary and secondary classrooms) and community buildings (local markets, fish markets, community center, etc.).

12. Electric Power

a. In May 1971 the total installed electric capacity in MR4 was in excess of 30,120 Kw. Of this 14,280 Kw was installed between January 1970 and 15 May 1971 by Vietnam Power Company (VPC). In 1971 VPC started a program to increase the electrical power in the Delta. In 1971 alone about 9,150 Kw of new generating capacity will be added in province towns and 1,500 Kw in various district towns. The USAID funded An Giang Electric Co-op System was enlarged to a total of 10,400 connected customers. There were several "self-help" community electrical systems developed in the same period.

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13. Potable Water

a. From January 1970 to 15 May 1971 there were ten successful wells drilled in the Delta. During this period seven well drilling rigs concentrated their efforts and attempts to find fresh water aquifers in the salt water salient. In 1971 GVN started to drill five deep and three shallow wells. Also are programmed and funded: Fifteen water plant construction and six improvements, mainly in province towns. Besides the GVN controlled city or town water systems several communities built their own smaller system on "self-help" basis, involving the community itself.

14. Engineering

a. Secondary Road and Bridge Status of this program as of 15 May 1971 is as follows:

Actual construction has started on twenty five of one hundred and forty eight (148) Road and Bridge projects for 1971. Anticipate that 50-60% of the remaining one hundred and twenty three (123) will be started by May 1971. Some lesser projects will not start until years end. This can be contributed to lack of construction effort available, low priority and material delivery problems, the latter, mainly in the area of bridge delivery by CPDC and rock shortage.

b. All Dredging programs and projects are now controlled by the newly formed Vietnam Dredging Agency (VDA). Monthly production continues on the increase from a base of approximately 250,000 m³, as more projects are funded and the number of operating dredges increase.

15. Logistics

a. During 1970, a total of 371,168 metric tons of food stuffs and counterinsurgency construction commodities were received in MR4 and distributed for various programs and projects. In addition, 300 tons of captured was received and shipped to various provinces for distribution to Refugees. (See Inclosures 1-3)

b. During the period of September 1969 through November 1970, CIA was responsible for planning and organizing for the receipt, storage, and issue of fifty-four (54) line items (approximately 78,000 pieces) of clothing and equipment for RDC personnel. On its completion in August 1970 CIA, phased out of this project and MORD, Saigon, assumed responsibility by making direct shipment or direct pick-up by all provinces. There are tentative plans for CIA to again assume this responsibility provided sufficient stock is on hand in Saigon to warrant stockage at region level.

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c. Personnel - as of 30 March 1970, CIA Can Tho, experienced the turn over of a new CIA Representative who has organized and trained personnel to satisfactorily perform their duties. During October 1970, a decision to release all USAID direct hired warehouse laborers was reached. 5 January 1971 all warehouse laborers were terminated.

d. CIA Can Tho acquired land for a new CIA warehouse complex. Time involved to purchase land and to construct warehouses precluded final construction as future plans call for commodities to be shipped direct from Saigon to Provinces. An alternate plan was discussed to construct these GVN warehouses at a new industrial site being built near Can Tho. Lot number 13 was purchased by CIA Saigon. After completion the warehouses could be used by the GVN, leased by Can Tho or sold to commercial firms. At Sa Dec land was purchased, fill was made available, but again the amount of time involved precluded final construction of the warehouse.

e. MORD, Saigon has shipped Pasco prefab warehouses to Kien Tuong, Bac Lieu and An Xuyen. The warehouse at Kien Tuong is operational. Bac Lieu and An Xuyen cannot construct their warehouses because some parts are missing. Chuong Thien has received one Pasco prefab warehouse. Estimated time for completion is May 1971. A shipment of that warehouse for Dinh Tuong Province was delivered from CIA Saigon 29 March 1971. Estimated time of completion is 31 May 1971.

16. Transportation

a. Province Maintenance Centers

The Philco-Ford training contract ended in May 1970 and was not extended. Shop personnel in eleven shops received the complete ten-step training program. Time did not permit completion of all steps. The basic structures in fifteen provinces have been completed although much of the supplementary construction has not been completed (see inclosure 2, Status of Province Maintenance Shops). Repair parts continue to be a problem. One shop has received all of its requisitions for initial parts (free issue); the remainder have received partial fill ranging from 10% to 60%. Routine requisitions are the same and average only about 20% fill. All of the shops are being operated by the GVN and have personnel of varying degrees of capability ranging from a very high degree to a very low degree. During the year MORD made distribution of 5 ton cargo trucks to two provinces (Chau Doc - 2 each and Bac Lieu - 2 each).

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ACTIVITY USAGE COUNTERSURGENCY AND PL-480 COMMODITIES

COMMODITY	REV	DEVELOP	EDUC	LOCAL	CIA	REFUGEES	SOCIAL	PUBLIC	NAT.	WELFARE	HEALTH	POLICE	AGRICULTURE	VOLAG
ROLLED OATS (23 Kg)	5731		61	50	0	6095	35330	143	0				39	8253
ROLLED WHEAT (23 Kg)	3313		15	80	300	1341	9850	0	0				72	1568
CORNMEAL (23 Kg)	5317		1	21	0	3563	32424	0	0				185	3426
FLOUR (23 Kg)	1527		19893	30	0	2720	22514	0	174				148	41333
CMS (23 Kg)	5292		1	0	0	2746	28697	150	0				100	20609
TOTAL														

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CEMENT: ROOFING AL.: REBAR: : BULGUR: CORN : COOKING OIL: MILK DRY: ROLLED OATS: ROLLED WHEAT: CORNMEAL: FLOUR : CMS
 184604: 348552 : 2,318,599: 72463 : 12489: 456251 : 54098 : 55702 : 16539 : 44937 : 88339 : 57595

* Voluntary Agencies

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RD CADRE STATUS 31 MARCH 1971

PROV- INCE	RDC GROUPS						RD CADRE STRENGTH										TOTAL AUTHORIZED	TOTAL ASSIGNED
	AUTHORIZED			ON HAND			AUTHORIZED			ON HAND			ATTENDING VT/NTC	ABSENT FROM DUTY				
	10-MAN	5-MAN	3	10-MAN	5-MAN	3	10-MAN	5-MAN	3	10-MAN	5-MAN	3			POG	DETACH		
AG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	175	5	175	0	0	179	160
AK	30	6	17	6	300	30	170	30	25	92	21	73		0	5	447	299	
BX	102	8	51	8	1020	40	509	40	42	189	38	212		0	12	1291	811	
EL	70	4	23	4	700	20	232	20	30	83	28	127		0	18	838	425	
GD	113	5	55	5	1130	25	550	23	42	200	40	268		0	28	1397	911	
GT	65	5	31	5	650	25	316	30	30	122	29	130		0	21	827	526	
DT	132	7	43	7	1320	35	414	33	50	346	38	315		33	57	1751	890	
GC	65	4	45	4	650	20	433	20	30	138	33	172		4	38	838	700	
HT	83	7	42	7	830	35	420	35	40	163	38	208		1	32	1069	734	
PH	200	9	57	9	2000	45	562	45	55	335	37	360		6	28	2415	1098	
PT	93	6	29	6	930	30	322	30	40	178	26	153		5	5	1178	541	
KT	31	4	12	4	310	20	131	17	25	67	25	101		1	1	422	276	
PD	92	7	60	7	920	35	595	35	40	227	39	204		0	42	1222	915	
SD	70	4	37	4	700	20	365	20	30	130	28	170		1	32	880	616	
VB	122	7	93	7	1220	35	934	35	42	187	34	243		0	34	1404	1284	
VL	127	7	82	7	1270	35	750	35	50	241	38	270		0	34	596	1127	
TOTAL NR 4	1395	90	677	90	13950	450	6703	450	575	2878	497	3181		51	351	17853	11273	

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D R A C

1 January 70 thru 31 March 1971

ACTIVITY USAGE

COUNTERSURGENCY AND PL-480 COMMODITIES

COMMODITY	REV DEVELOP	EDUC	LOCAL GVN	CLA MAINT	REFUGEES	SOCIAL WELFARE	PUBLIC HEALTH	NAT POLICE	AGRICUL- TURE	VOLAG
CEMENT (50 Kg)	91838	31835	15551	8523	2249	10529	10401	8021	2389	3271
ROOFING (Sheet)	84732	23797	14747	2679	125199	85709	3699	3290	970	3712
REBAR (Kilo)	1685421	296045	123205	53766	10352	45369	57064	24060	14324	8993
BULGUR (23 Kg)	5256	7	127	0	6115	58547	7	143	28	2233
CORN (45 Kg)	80	0	115	50	1050	1702	0	0	9492	0
COOKING OIL (4 Kg/can)	51212	34	16321	1025	33114	321137	1787	102	2406	29113
MILK, DRY (25 Kg)	3165	659	2203	410	3451	22943	178	40	141	21041

* Voluntary Agencies

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17. Education

a. Significant developments in the Delta's education program during 1970-71 through 15 May were:

Elementary Education

(1) Construction of Classrooms

VSD Programmed Classrooms Completed....	738
MOE " " "	31
Chieu Hoi " " "	9
SPA " " "	12
People Self Help " " "	25
Private " " "	28
Refugee " " "	10
Total	<u>853</u>

(2) MR4 Elementary School Teacher Supply

VSD Programmed Teachers - 3 month program	1,220
Daily wage teachers	570
Teachers for Refugee Schools	108
Teachers Assigned from Normal Schools ...	<u>628</u>
Total No. of Teachers	<u>2,526</u>

(3) Primary School Teacher Training Institutions

Two new pedagogical centers have been opened at Soc Trang and Can Tho bringing the total number to 5 in MR4, with a potential when fully utilized, of supplying 2,550 teachers needed annually in MR4. Two new dormitories with a capacity of 784 were opened at Vinh Long Normal School.

(4) Text Books

The joint Elementary School Text Book program shared by GVN, US and Free World assistance, produced and distributed 18 million copies of 37 elementary school textbook titles. Currently 5 million textbooks are needed per year and soon the need will be 10 million.

(5) Anticipated teacher supply from various sources for 1971 CY:

Daily Wage teachers	1,320
Normal School graduates	880
Refugee School teachers	<u>100</u>
Total	<u>2,300</u>

b. Secondary Education Development - 1964 - 1971

Secondary Education has made phenomenal growth in MR4 since 1964 as follows:

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(1)

<u>Item</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>Increase</u>	<u>% Increase</u>
High Schools	135	293	158	117%
Teachers	1,952	4,489	2,537	130%
Classrooms	1,000	2,029	1,029	103%
Students	71,993	169,626	97,633	133%

(2) 184 classrooms providing facilities for 18,400 students were completed in 1970. This will permit 25% of High School age students to enroll in high school for 1970-71 school term.

(3) 392 high school teachers completed training at the University of Can Tho. Inservice Training is provided for regular teachers during the summer vacation period.

(4) 75 student parent associations are active in high schools with a membership of 34,402 in MR4.

(5) Comprehensive Pilot High School development got underway in four pilot high schools at Rach Gia, Long Xuyen, Can Tho, and Kien Hoa. This is an important step forward for education in Vietnam. The MOE has designated 31 additional comprehensive high schools in MR4.

(6) 101,500,000VN\$ is the budget from MOE and CPDC to build 133 new classrooms during 1971. This is not enough to provide facilities to enroll 35% of high school youth.

(7) Anticipated teacher supply for CY 1971 is 342, against a need for 1,123 additional high school teachers required to meet MOE high school goals FY 1971.

c. Technical and Agricultural Schools

(1) MR4 has 8 technical schools in 8 of its 16 provinces, each with a capacity of 750 to 1,000 students. The large Poly Tech at Vinh Long has capacity for 1,600 students.

(2) Regular day enrollment in 1970-71 was 2,177. The anticipated enrollment for 1971-72 is 2,810.

(3) Trades taught in these schools are: Auto mechanics, Sheet metal, electricity, machine shop, welding, carpentry, Radio, and Masonry.

(4) 1,248 Refugees were given 3 month-accelerated vocational training courses during 1970-71.

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d. Vocational Agricultural High Schools

(1) 2,124 students are enrolled in agricultural high schools located at: Can Tho (1,004), Soc Trang (200), My Tho (700), Long Xuyen (120), and Phu Vinh (100).

(2) 4 chapters of "Future Farmers of Vietnam" are now in operation.

(3) Limited funds and staff will prevent expansion of agricultural high schools in CY 1971-72.

e. Normal Schools and Pedagogical Centers

(1) Student enrollments have increased from 258 in 1964 to 1,252 in 1970, an increase of 500%.

(2) In 1969, Normal School training was centered in Vinh Long. In 1970, there were 5 centers in operation in the Delta as follows: Soc Trang, Can Tho, Long Xuyen, My Tho, and Vinh Long. We now have a capacity for 2,550 students in training.

(3) The annual need for trained elementary school teachers in MR4 is 2,600.

f. Higher Education

(1) Higher education during 1970 was centered in University of Can Tho with a total enrollment of 4,000.

(2) Another university is getting under way at Long Xuyen, called Hoa Hao, with 1,350 students.

(3) Plans are underway to start a community college at My Tho.

g. Major Education Objective in MR4 - 1971

The major objective of Education in MR4 is to decentralize itself from the MOE Ministry of Education in Saigon so it can operate its schools as it sees fit to meet the needs of the people. Sector Superintendents would be named to manage the new school system. In FY 1971, an Educational Sector consisting of An Giang, Kien Giang and Chau Doc Provinces, is programmed.

E. Field Operations Programs

1. The Pacification Research Teams (PRT) have been increased in number from original 9 teams to a total of 13 at this time. The organization has been authorized a total of 17 teams in order to provide a 3 man team for each province and a 4 man team as a mobile, regional team.

2. Of significant importance, it may be noted that as of August 1970, the administration for the PRP was transferred to Saigon under the auspices of the Pacification Studies Group (PSG) in an attempt to standardize the administration for the program throughout SVN. At this time the teams have not been recruited to fill all the allotted spaces. This can be attributed to the fact that removal of the administration from MR4 to Saigon has placed the program in a state of near limbo since August 1970.

3. The increase in the number of teams will make it possible to provide the provinces and DEPCORDS, DRAC with both more and better data. The method of operations for the teams at this time is to conduct the Pacification Attitudes Analysis System (PAAS) survey the first 10 days of the month. This is in support of the PSG, Saigon. The balance of the month the teams conduct surveys for the PSA's of the province they are assigned to, and conduct special surveys at the direction of DEPCORDS.

4. The majority of the surveys conducted to date have dealt with the Land to the Tiller Law and it's impact/reception by the people. At this time the teams are involved in the conduct of a survey with regard to the Phung Hoang program. Other programs that have received attention are Chieu Hoi, Public Health, attitudes of the people toward elected officials from hamlet to national level, and agriculture. These surveys are used by the respective divisions within CORDS, DRAC, to evaluate the peoples' reaction to various programs and to assist in the improvement of the programs and conditions for the people.

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5. The RD Cadre Program and the methods of operation have changed significantly since the previous debriefing report. During March 1971 the 30-man para-military groups were reorganized into new 10-man political groups. The new 10-man groups (677 groups) are deployed as directed by the Provincial Pacification and Development Council to the C, D and E village and hamlets, with security being provided by the local Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) unit. Under the 1971 RD Cadre Program the 10-man RDC Group Leader serves as the Assistant to the Village Chief for Development and the Village Chief has complete operational control of the deployed groups, subject to guidelines established by Province, Regional and National authorities. A new 5-man District Group has replaced the old inter-group leader concept. This new 5-man District Group provides Rural Development technical guidance to the District and Village Chiefs and serves as an administrative link between the deployed 10-man groups and the provincial Rural Development Cadre Control Groups. Reorganization of the old 30-man groups into 10-man groups was completed during the month of March when 677 new 10-man groups were formed and deployed in MR4. RDC Advisors were informed that the new 10-man groups were to be deployed in "C", "D", and "E" villages and hamlets before deployment in low "B" villages and none should be deployed in "A" villages.

6. The conversion of US support from OSA to DOD has been completed. All logistical requirements including payment of the cadres is now being funded by DOD and managed by GVN. The US Advisory effort in MR4 has been reduced from 4 DOD Civilians and 60 US Military to 3 DOD Civilians and 26 US Military. Officially the RD Cadre Program is scheduled to be completely phased out by 30 June 1974 with a 25% reduction each year. MR4 has achieved their 25% reduction for FY 1971. The unofficial phase out is 30 June 1972.

7. Military Region 4 has 3,200 cadres on detached status at the present time. They are detached to the various ministries at Provincial level and are engaged in such tasks as Land Reform, War Veteran Affairs, Agriculture Land Bank, Village Self Development Programs, Phung Hoang, Province Pacification and Development Coordination Centers. By 31 December 1971, the personnel will either be absorbed by their respective agency or returned to the RD Cadre role.

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8. During the period 1 January 1970 to 31 March 1971, the PSDF continued steady growth concurrently developing the basic military skills of each member by upgrading the entire program. The number of PSDF members organized increased by 355,430 from 1,246,583 to 1,602,030. The number trained increased by 68,231 from 1,202,736 to a total of 1,270,967. Presently there are 485,932 Combat Trained and 815,814 Support Trained. The number armed increased during the period by 94,714 weapons from 104,643 to 199,357.

9. The single most important achievement by the PSDF during the period was the creation, organization and training of the Key Inter Team (KIT) PSDF. The KIT in MR4 are presently at 96% of authorized strength. During the beginning of 1971 through the advent of the 1971 Local Defense and Community Development Plan two new entities were added to the Hardcore Category of PSDF, Urban and Rural Hardcore Teams, which are 11 man teams receiving the same training as KIT PSDF. Urban and Rural status is as follows: 3668 Rural Teams authorized--- 1790 Teams organized (49%), 14,504 Urban Teams authorized--- 968 Teams organized (6%).

10. There are five objectives to the PSDF Program:

- a. To involve the maximum number of citizens in support of the GVN and its political and security objectives.
- b. To provide the population with the means to defend their families, homes, villages/hamlets against infiltration, subversion and attack.
- c. To assist the National Police and Vietnamese Armed Forces in maintaining security and public order.
- d. To promote community development activities for self help and improvement of villages/hamlets in rural and urban areas.
- e. To assist the police in identifying and eliminating the enemy.

11. The effectiveness of the PSDF to accomplish the objectives varies from poor to excellent depending on training and local leadership. Participation in PSDF, is a firm, and visible commitment to the Government of South Vietnam. The Viet Cong recognize this political and military potential of the PSDF withholding from them needed support and resources, thus they fear it as a peoples' organization, thus the PSDF have become a prime target of the enemy.

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12. The more prominent problem areas are:

a. The congregation of PSDF in static defensive positions, thus allowing themselves to be targeted by the enemy at their convenience inflicting severe casualties and loss of weapons.

b. Obtaining accurate figures in regard to the status of the PSDF Program allowing realistic decisions to be made. More often than not statistics presented by the provinces and the districts are vastly inflated giving a false picture. This includes all areas such as teams organized, people organized, weapons distributed, and people trained.

F. Chieu Hoi Program

1. A total of 26,100 Hoi Chanh rallied in MR4 during the period 1 January 1970 to 1 May 1971. This figure represents more than 60% of the nationwide total for the same period. The ralliers included 910 ranking Hoi Chanh, 15 NVA and 14 Regroupees from the North.

2. In addition to the traditional influx of returnees experienced during the post-Tet periods, there were 3 significant efforts that contributed heavily to the high rate of ralliers and influenced the shifts in the geographical rallying pattern within the provinces of the Delta. First, the ARVN incursions into Cambodia resulted in a tremendous increase in the returnee rates in the border provinces of Kien Phong, Kien Tuong and Chau Doc during May and June 1970. Second, the massive redeployment of ARVN and territorial forces and the launching of concerted pacification efforts during Phase II of the Special P&D Campaign of 1970 generated record numbers of Hoi Chanh in Mo Cay, Don Nhon, Song Ong Doc, Dam Doi, Gia Rai and Phung Hiep districts. Particularly outstanding was the progress achieved in Kien Hoa, where 3,227 Hoi Chanh were accounted for during the last 6 months of 1970. Most of this number came from the Ba Vat area which was under VC control for more than 6 years before GVN presence was established. Third, the relentless military operations conducted by the 21st ARVN Division in the U Minh Forest resulted in the heavy influx of returnees into Kien Giang, An Xuyen and Chuong Thien during February and March 1971. A total of 2,323 Hoi Chanh were received in the 3 provinces during that two-month period, most of them rallying in Kien An, Kien Hung, Kien Luong and Thoi Binh districts.

3. Aside from the normal drops in the Hoi Chanh rate experienced during the pre-Tet periods, the other low points of the Delta Chieu Hoi program came during the step-up in enemy harassment activities in April 1970. The slackening of activities because of the absence of military assets in late June and early July 1970, and the periods of heavy rains, extensive floods and some sporadic enemy terroristic activities coupled with the hopes generated for an extended truce in November and December 1970 likewise contributed to the slight decrease during that time frame.

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4. The Armed Propaganda Team (APT) strength of the Delta was maintained at an average of 2,000 cadres during the period. Improper utilization of provincial units remained as a major problem during 1970 as Province Chiefs and Chieu Hoi Chiefs who exercise command and control of APT's generally failed to appreciate their potentials. However, some success was achieved in Sa Dec, Dinh Tuong, Kien Tuong, Kien Giang, Ba Xuyen and Vinh Binh. During the 1st quarter of 1971, by virtue of the directives issued by the Ministry of Chieu Hoi, provinces started employing APT units with DIOCC's, to assist in the campaign against the VCI, while other cadres were utilized to assist in the training of PSDF units. Provinces reported that APT's are much more effective employed in this manner.

5. The most serious problems that were encountered during the period involved the overcrowding of two provincial CH Centers as a result of the influx of returnees and the investigation of 5 CH Service Chiefs for corrupt practices and inefficiency. In Kien Hoa in September 1970 it became necessary to establish two additional temporary centers in Ba Vat and Cho Thom to relieve the congestion at the provincial center. In Kien Giang in February 1971, tents had to be pitched and all available structures in both the HC hamlet and the center were converted into CH sleeping quarters. Five Chieu Hoi Service Chiefs, those in Phong Dinh, Bac Lieu, Kien Giang, Sa Dec and Vinh Binh were relieved for graft, corruption or inefficiency during the period. Their replacements, invariably turned out to be better program managers and administrators.

6. MR4 was given a goal of 14,000 Hoi Chanh for 1971 (from 1 March 1971 to 28 February 1972) and barring any drastic changes from the general situation that prevailed during 1970, the goal is likely to be attained.

7. Improved HC interrogation and exploitation methods have resulted in more HC-led operations during the period. The interrogation of newly arrived HC for information on the VCI and for locations of VC weapons and supply caches has always been given high priority in MR4. 1970 was a record year in the recovery of VC weapons by HC-led operations. June 1970 became the record month in quality ralliers and in the exploitation of Hoi Chanh in the Delta as ranking VC came in and led GVN units to the capture of 5 major arms caches near the Cambodian border.

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8. Psychological exploitation of Hoi Chanh was the key to the success of the concerted PSYOP campaigns launched in the Delta during the period. Operation Roundup in Kien Hoa during the last quarter of 1970 and the PSYOP effort in support of the U Minh Operations during the 1st quarter of 1971 gave emphasis to the production and dissemination of Cheu Hoi materials mostly based on HC information. Both campaigns were very successful inducement efforts, as they generated a large number of ralliers in the provinces in which they were launched.

9. A total of 7,200 Hoi Chanh in MR4 received vocational training during the past 16 months. Basic training in carpentry, masonry, barbering and tailoring was given to 6,500 ralliers in the provinces, while 700 selected HC were graduated for the advanced vocational courses at the Regional CH Center. A total of 27.6% of all ralliers in MR4 during the period received vocational training. This is an increase of 9.7% over 1969.

10. Throughout all Chieu Hoi Centers courses in animal husbandry and agriculture were taught as blocks of instruction within the political indoctrination framework. Overall, Ba Xuyen, Kien Hoa and the Regional CH Center offered the most effective vocational training. But the most notable progress in vocational training, both in quantity and quality, occurred at the MR4 Regional Chieu Hoi Center. During the past 16 months a total of 700 selected Hoi Chanh from the provinces received advanced vocational training at the Regional Center in the 3-month standard courses of automotive repair, furniture making, tailoring, electrical house-wiring and plumbing. Furthermore, 1970 saw the Regional Center accept the largest, single class in its history, composed of 214 ralliers. Plans for 1971 call for approximately 2,000 Hoi Chanh to be trained at the Regional Center. This will be an increase of more than 400% over 1970's results.

11. Some minor progress was also noted in the field of political reindoctrination. The fielding of selected APT cadres who were trained as political instructors in Saigon gave life to this once neglected program.

12. Of the 26,100 Hoi Chanh who were received in MR4, a total of 4,808 (18.4%) found immediate employment upon release from Chieu Hoi Centers. It is unknown how many ralliers became employed by either private or official organizations during the period of draft deferment or after its expiration.

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13. A total of 1,900 HC were recruited all over the Delta into the RF/PF during the period. The biggest recruiter of Hoi Chanh was Kien Hoa with a total of 583. The other provinces which recruited more than 100 Hoi Chanh into RF/PF during the period were An Xuyen, Vinh Long, Kien Giang, Phong Dinh, Chuong Thien and Vinh Binh in that order.

14. There has been no new construction of Chieu Hoi hamlets since 1970; 9 of the 11 hamlets previously authorized -- those in An Giang, Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chuong Thien, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Kien Giang, Kien Tuong and Vinh Binh -- were completed and turned over to province administrations. Only the hamlets authorized for Phong Dinh and Kien Hoa have yet to be completed. A total of 642 ex-HC families have resettled in Chieu Hoi hamlets in the Delta.

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G. Psychological Warfare and Information

1. During 1970 and early 1971, several special psychological operation campaigns were conducted in the Delta in support of the Government of Vietnam's 1970 Pacification and Development Plan and 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan. The campaigns included coordinated psychological operations (PSYOPS) activities such as leaflet drops, taped aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, posters, cartoon books, handbills and radio and television broadcasts. The advisory efforts of PSYOPS CORDS, DRAC, were exerted through the Vietnamese Information Service, in cooperation with American advisors, and other GVN military and civilian channels. An excellent example is the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) exposure campaign carried out under CORDS/DRAC'S PSYOPS Division's leadership in support of the Phung Hoang program.

2. VCI Exposure Support

a. The basic purpose of the VCI exposure campaign is to aid in the neutralization of all properly identified communist political cadre. One early successful example occurred in January 1970 in Chuong Thien Province where a member of the VCI was captured within 24 hours after a Phung Hoang poster identifying him was tacked up.

b. As the success of the Phung Hoang program to a large extent depends upon the cooperation of the public and its willingness to volunteer information, a variety of media were used to educate the people on the ways in which the program operates for their benefit. One extensively used medium was cartoon books distributed through the schools in villages and hamlets. The Province PSYOPS advisor in Vinh Long Province developed a cartoon booklet which was printed by MACV for national distribution in 500,000 copies. When the popularity of this booklet was confirmed, JUSPAO ran another printing of the booklet and 250,000 of this second printing were distributed in the Delta. A Cambodian version was also used. However, the basic instrument of the VCI exposure campaign used throughout the reporting period was the VCI exposure poster.

c. Progress in carrying out the VCI exposure campaign was, of course, not uniform. After the initial flurry of posters and leaflets, a loss of momentum became noticeable. However, with command emphasis from regional through province levels, the campaign gained impetus during the latter half of 1970. As the year closed, Go Cong, Sa Dec, and Vinh Long Provinces had achieved the goal of exposing all of their known communist cadre.

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d. Even though a few VIS chiefs preferred to leave participation in the Phung Hoang program to the Sector S-5's, sufficient gains were made so that the CPOC reported that during 1970, it produced 2,000,000 Phung Hoang VCI exposure posters under 356 separate requests from Delta provinces. An additional 1,500,000 leaflets were produced.

3. Chieu Hoi Support

a. Strong emphasis on support to Phung Hoang during the reporting period did not detract from the attention paid by MR4 PSYOPS to the Chieu Hoi program. Although the emphasis on Chieu Hoi appeals did not change, there were new aspects to the type of PSYOPS activity directed at communist audiences. Because the enemy main force units fragmented under GVN pressure, massive leaflet drops over wide areas were relied on less than smaller drops of specifically developed leaflets for specific targets. This type of PSYOPS targeting reached its peak usage in "Operation Roundup", a three month campaign in Kien Hoa Province designed to maintain and if possible increase an already record breaking Chieu Hoi rate which was being stimulated by ARVN operations in former VC strongholds in that province. Operation Roundup concentrated all available PSYOPS resources of the province, ARVN, VNAF, USAF, Vietnamese and US Navies, CPOC, USARV, and VIS upon contested areas from late September through December 1970. At first, to familiarize the populace and communist troops with the Chieu Hoi program some general Chieu Hoi theme leaflets were used, but the emphasis soon shifted to the use of Chieu Hoi testimonial leaflets.

b. The Chieu Hoi testimonial leaflet is a personally handwritten appeal by a recent rallier addressed to his former compatriots. During the three month campaign coordinated by the Kien Hoa Province PSYOPS Advisor, approximately 230 different testimonial leaflet orders were printed by CPOC. A survey of 500 Hoi Chanh indicated that 90% had read a testimonial leaflet. Thirty percent indicated that they personally knew the author of the leaflet and were among those addressed directly by the writer.

c. Naturally leaflet drops were only part of the techniques used to reach potential Hoi Chanhhs. Improved identification of VC members through intelligence permitted a variety of face-to-face communications between government cadre and the families of Viet Cong guerrillas to convince them of the sincerity of the amnesty offer to ralliers. Radio announcements, posters and booklets were also used. It is known that nearly all of the 19,587 Hoi Chanhhs who rallied in the Delta in CY 1970 read a leaflet. A substantial number of the Hoi Chanhhs reported that they were also persuaded to rally by their family members.

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4. Land to the Tiller Support

a. The promulgation of the Land to the Tiller Law in Can Tho on March 26, 1970 by President Thieu and its subsequent execution were events given priority exploitation by PSYOPS, CPOC, the Province PSYOPS Advisors and their Vietnamese counterparts. An integrated project utilizing all appropriate media including television and radio as well as printed materials was carried out in keeping with the progress of the administration of this politically important land reform program.

b. Some of the more widely distributed and most frequently re-ordered materials were developed by the Combined Psychological Operations Center (CPOC) in connection with ceremonial visits to MR4 by President Thieu to promulgate the law, to present the first land titles in 1970 and to commemorate the program's first anniversary on March 26, 1971. Literally, millions of leaflets were distributed both by air drop and by hand. Most of these featured a picture of the President and instructions either in Vietnamese or Cambodian on how to make an application for a valid land title. Perhaps this program was the most eagerly publicized program of the entire Pacification and Development Plan on the part of Provincial VIS Chiefs. President Thieu's identification with the program and its potentially popular results undoubtedly provided strong motivation. By the end of 1970, an impartial survey indicated that more than 75 percent of the rural adult population was aware of the Land to the Tiller Law and understood its intent.

5. RF/PF, PSDF Support

a. As security in the Delta was consolidated by territorial forces, PSYOPS provided assistance to the recruiting, training and morale of RF/PF units. At the regional level, this assistance was primarily in the form of materials developed by CPOC. They included a variety of recruiting posters, handbills, and wallet-size cards explaining the principles that guide a good soldier's conduct (e.g. a platoon leader's code of leadership, reasons for promotion, and a code of conduct). Educational or training aids developed by CPOC and distributed through sector channels to RF and PF units were a poster depicting the correct way to set up an outpost and cartoon booklet describing ambush techniques. The Popular Forces and the People's Self Defense Force, as the largest single organization in the region, was the target for material intended to encourage the members to volunteer information on VC activities. At the province level, the PPA's and S-5 advisors used every opportunity to stimulate their counterparts in publicizing the local successes of RF/PF and PSYOPS units. These PSYOP activities are expected to be continued at a high priority level through the remainder of 1971.

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6. Radio and Television

a. Can Tho Television, Channel 7, celebrated its second successful year of operation in November 1970. Although handicapped by the normal problems of budgetary and equipment limitations, Can Tho TV has shown ingenuity in overcoming these obstacles. The station manager has shown strong interest in developing programs tailored to the interests of local audiences, offering air time for regular performances of provincial cultural drama teams and information sections of various government agencies. The station also pays attention to the needs of the Delta's largest minority group, the Cambodians. Daily newcasts include a Cambodian language portion and the manager frequently expresses a desire to have a regular Cambodian language variety program.

b. Although television is the newest and more glamorous media available in the Delta, radio is still the average person's contact with the world outside of his home village. Radio Can Tho is a 10 Kw station which can be received anywhere in the Delta. About 75 percent of Can Tho's radio programming originates in Saigon and the other 25 percent is locally produced. Of twelve newcasts daily, nine are relayed from Saigon and three use local materials. The sources for local news for Can Tho Radio, as is also true of the television station, are the provincial VIS offices, JUSPAO special event service tapes, and the local military command for news of the RF, PF and PSDF.

c. Pacification and Development programming is carried on locally originated broadcasts as well as those relayed from Saigon. Examples of locally originated programs include a weekly broadcast of names, ages and addresses of identified and exposed VCI, a weekly Chieu Hoi program, PSDF news and regular shows from Vinh Binh, Chau Doc, and Vinh Long provinces, among others, with a variety format with features and reportage about Pacification and Development. When the Saigon broadcasting station doubles its broadcasting power later this year, there will be less justification for requiring Radio Can Tho to spend 75 percent of its air time relaying programs and more time might possibly be devoted to locally originated programs.

7. PSYOP Support to ARVN Operations

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a. The principal areas of concentration in support of ARVN operations during 1970 and early 1971 were the Seven Mountains in Chau Doc, the U Minh Forest and Cambodia. The Seven Mountains were intensively targeted beginning in January 1970 with arrangements made through MACV and offshore printing facilities to print leaflets specifically targeted against NVA units operating there. The CPOC arranged for heavy drops to be scheduled every two weeks with loudspeaker missions following B-52 strikes. Both USAF and VNAF aircraft were utilized. Beginning with the initiation of intensive ARVN operations in the U Minh Forest in December 1970 and carrying on through May 1971, similar targeting by PSYOPS activity was made in that area.

b. The PSYOP support provided during the ARVNAF offensive operations from MR4 into Cambodia beginning 11 May 1970 was timely, appropriate and properly placed. For example, when the 9th ARVN Division crossed into Cambodia east of the Mekong River to clear the area south of Route 1, and supporting VN Navy and Marine elements advanced up the Mekong River, PSYOP aircraft were over airheads on each side of the Neak Luan Ferry crossing as the assault troops landed. Leaflets and tapes targeting both Cambodian civilians and VC/NVA forces were used at the crossing site. Leaflets were dropped on known and suspected enemy positions close to the border and along the river. Simultaneously, other PSYOP support aircraft were following the lead elements on the two main axes of advance, dropping leaflets and playing tapes over populated areas which advised civilians of the situation. This complete PSYOP support was a result of early and detailed planning, to include thorough pilot briefings. The planning also provided for an aircraft to be available for quick reaction to exploit targets of opportunity. A similar, yet more complex, operation began on 17 May when two ARVN Divisions plus Marines, Rangers, and Armored Cavalry regiments moved into Cambodia between the Mekong River and the Gulf of Siam. Once again PSYOP support was immediately available over three separate airheads and to the lead elements on four axes of advance. These operations, the largest ever conducted by MR4, demonstrated the value of integrating PSYOP with the tactical planning. Further, cross border operations to reopen Highway 4 in Cambodia received PSYOP advisory support during January 1971.

8. Vietnamization

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a. 1970 was primarily a year in which the rapid gains in Vietnamization of the MR4 PSYOPS effort consolidated in preparation for greater steps in 1971. Measures were taken to prepare the Vietnamese for further reductions in American resources at the regional and provincial levels. In the case of the Vietnamese Information Service, all local printing responsibility was shifted to VIS with the transfer of the M-85 multilith presses. Beginning in 1971, the responsibility for printing supplies for the operation of presses belonged to the Ministry of Information. Phasing out of the American Administrative Assistants as tours were completed was initiated late in 1970, with only two remaining at this time. A similar process began for Province PSYOPS Advisors during early 1971.

b. The Combined Psychological Operations Center was established as a joint US-Vietnamese operation in 1969, combining the resources of the American 10th PSYOPS Battalion and the Vietnamese 40th POLWAR Battalion. In February 1970, a proposal for the Vietnamization of the 10th PSYOPS Battalion was approved by COMUSMACV. The preparatory steps taken to facilitate this proposal were immediately started. This included assigning more Vietnamese printers to the 10th PSYOPS printing plant until all shifts were composed of Vietnamese printers with American printers serving only in an advisory role; distribution of a Vietnamese version of the CPOC catalogue to Vietnamese provincial and district PSYOPS personnel (VIS and RVNAF); and shifting interrogation duties to the Vietnamese interpreters who had been working with American interrogators. The ARVN personnel experienced little difficulty in making the necessary changes and were able to take over the entire operation of CPOC in March of this year when the 10th PSYOPS Battalion was inactivated and turned its equipment over to the 40th POLWAR Battalion.

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H. Public Health

1. During this period upgrading of hospital facilities continued with new medical supply warehouses completed at 5 hospitals and another nearing completion. At two hospitals, intensive care units were constructed and water distribution systems installed at two hospitals facilities. Electrical distribution systems were completed at one facility and nearing completion at another. These improvements, coupled with MCH/MOD funded new ward construction, have improved facilities considerably. New equipment in many areas such as X-Ray and Laboratory has increased support capabilities.

2. Joint utilization of twelve facilities was implemented and has proven successful. It provided for the first time, the additional Vietnamese physicians required to provide professional care to hospitalized patients, as well as physicians to be trained by US surgeons to perform emergency and general elective surgery. The additional personnel made available under this program eliminated practically all US service support missions within the hospital, allowing for full effort to be devoted to teaching, advising and extending concentrated effort into the rural health program.

3. Hospital outpatient visits in 1970 increased 13.6% over 1969 and for 1971 continues to show slight increases. Hospital admissions also increased 12.9% with 192,285 admissions during 1970 and increasing thus far in 1971 to an average of 16,151 admissions per month. While hospital admissions increased, Civilian War Casualty (CWC) admissions dropped from 13.9% of all admissions in 1969 to 11.02% for 1970 and thus far in 1971 averages 8.04%. Considering the density of population in MR4, the decreasing number of CWC's is an indication of the degree of overall pacification being attained throughout the region. The lowest number of CWC admissions occurred during February 1971 with 1,031 total admissions to all provincial hospitals.

4. As a result of joint utilization, Vietnamese physicians were now available for surgery. PHAP team qualified surgeons were available to teach and advise resulting in a tremendous increase in Vietnamese capability to become surgically self-sufficient. Of the total number of major operations performed, Vietnamese surgeons were responsible for 47% in 1969, 67% in 1970 and are averaging over 75% thus far in 1971. In minor surgery, their performance increased from 49% in 1969 to 72% in 1970 and over 85% thus far in 1971. Two Free World Medical Teams at two province hospitals (Spanish at Go Cong and Philippines at Dinh Tuong) perform 75% of all surgery. The increased capability of Vietnamese in provincial hospitals has resulted in a marked decrease in the requirement for US medical support personnel.

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5. During this period, joint utilization was extended to include the district level medical facilities in all provinces. It provided military medical personnel to augment the limited MOH staff available. Kerosene refrigerators were provided at district level for the storage of vaccines and biologicals. A regional joint MOH/CORDS inspection team was established to visit not only provincial hospitals but district and village medical facilities as well. The inspections are discovering problem areas which are being resolved at either provincial or regional level. They also serve as a means of checking management control and use of available resources.

6. A small slow sand filter water purification system was designed and constructed to provide potable water to a refugee population of 1,000. This system has been demonstrated to various health officials and has been well received as an inexpensive means of providing potable water in areas where the demand is not great. A number of potential sites have already been selected for possible construction projects under local development programs.

7. In line with the MOH program of emphasizing rural health, each province has initiated action to establish a sanitary hamlet, the first of three to be established in each province.

8. Progress made by the Vietnamese in the area of definitive medical care and ancillary services resulted in a reduced requirement for PHAP support in these areas. US Military (MILPHAP) Medical Teams have gradually been reduced by reorganization to provide for only the advisory services still required which are primarily in the rural health field. Authorized strength of MILPHAP teams at the beginning of 1970 was 106 total. Current recommended staffing is less than 50% of this number with additional modifications as VN capabilities increase.

9. The advisory effort in the medical logistics field also was reduced. Only two of the original five advisors remain with one, who will not be replaced, scheduled to depart in early June. Relocation of certain activities at the depot plus hardsurfacing of the outside area provided for better utilization of available space.

10. Because of a shortage of trained personnel in the area of logistics, a one year school was instituted at the Can Tho Medical Depot to train assistant pharmacists in supply procedures. Graduates of this school will be assigned to province medical supply activities. Generally, the medical supply system has been satisfactory, normally with sufficient stock in the depot to meet requirements.

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I. Phung Hoang Program

1. The period was one of steady progress for the Phung Hoang Program. During 1969 there were 23,335 Phung Hoang operations conducted, resulting in 6,960 persons killed, captured, and rallied. Neutralizations fell 240 short of the goal of 600 per month. Between 1 January 1970 and 25 March 1971, there were 45,397 Phung Hoang operations conducted in MR4, resulting in 12,136 neutralizations.

2. Neutralizations the first three months of this year averaged about 1,000 per month, approximately 100 per month more than the average for the final months of last year.

3. Specific targeting of identified suspects is the preferred method of neutralizing VCI. Consequently, improvement of methods and techniques to effect targeting continues to be a matter of highest priority. Advisory emphasis has concentrated on the development of province and district VCI intelligence collection and dossier preparation. The results are encouraging in that 21% of our neutralizations are via specific targeting, a vast improvement over previous years.

4. The Dong Khoi (Spontaneous Uprising) Campaign was initiated in November 1970. The concept is one of general mobilization, after necessary planning, of all assets and resources against the VCD at all echelons. Between November 1970 and 17 March 1971, a total of 10,509 operations were conducted, resulting in 3,920 A&B Category VCI killed, captured or rallied.

5. During the year 1 January 1970 to 1 January 1971, Phung Hoang continued to upgrade the training of Vietnamese operating personnel. The period saw the graduation of 912 persons from the PIOCC/DIOCC course at the Regional Phung Hoang School. An additional 100 students were trained between 12 April and 15 May 1971. From January 1970 to 15 May 1971, 401 DIOCC personnel completed a 44 hour Secret Investigators Course. Six-hundred-forty-four Village Deputies for Security received one week of training between 1 January 1971 and 26 March 1971. In country training of US Advisors was continued and upgraded. One-hundred-seventy-six officers and enlisted advisors completed the Phung Hoang School at Vung Tau. This is a five day school for officers and a 10 day school for enlisted men.

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6. Using information gathered by PIOCCs and DIOCCs, PSYOPS/VIS conducted a continuous campaign to expose all properly identified VCI. As of 31 March 1971, 100% exposure of all properly identified VCI had been achieved in the following provinces: Sa Dec, Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chau Doc, Go Cong, Kien Giang, Kien Phong, and Vinh Long.

7. The assignment of experienced counterintelligence personnel (MOS 9666 and 97B) as PIOCC/DIOCC Advisors and Deputy Advisors has had an extremely favorable impact on the program. In 1969 through June 1970, the bulk of US PIOCC/DIOCC personnel were inexperienced lieutenants and captains with limited counterintelligence training. Studies demonstrated that this lack of training and experience had an adverse effect on the program. Consequently, since July 1970, an attempt has been made to obtain counterintelligence trained replacements (MOS 9666). As of 1 April 1971, 12 of 16 province advisors were experienced 9666s, and the majority of 79 (89 authorized) DIOCC advisors were captains with 9666 MOS. All 16 provinces have an experienced 97B as the deputy PIOCC advisor, and many deputy DIOCC positions are now filled by 97Bs. Assignment of these individuals enhanced the quality of the advisory effort and has provided counterparts with greatly needed assistance.

8. Judicial and quasi-judicial processing of MR4 VCI achieved marked progress during the period. The primary judicial body involved, the Regional Military Field Court, resumed functioning in September 1970 and has been working to reduce the enormous backlog of cases. Administrative processing of security suspects by Province Security Committees achieved considerable functional refinements. Committee members became aware of their responsibilities as quasi-judicial officers and began to give attention to established operating standards. Security suspects currently are receiving the timely and orderly disposition authorized by law.

9. As an interim measure to upgrade the quality of the interrogation effort, a Mobile Interrogation Training Team was formed in March 1971, comprised of the Regional Phung Hoang Center Commander, and officer representatives of the MSS, G2, and FSB. In addition, an experienced US interrogator serves as advisor to the team. The team presents two full days of instruction to all interrogators in each province. The purpose is to improve interrogation/debriefing techniques and to present recent reorganizations within the VCI. Present plans call for the creation of Mobile Phung Hoang Inspection/Training Teams which would work primarily with PIOCC/DIOCC personnel on such matters as development of collection plans and targeting, as well as conduct refresher training in each PIOCC in MR4.

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10. The goal of having the National Police assume primary responsibility for Phung Hoang is anticipated to be accomplished by 31 December 1971. As of 1 April 1971, 10 of the 16 PIOCCs and 23 of the 94 DIOCCs were being supervised by NP/PSE. By 31 December 1971, it is expected that advisory personnel can be reduced to only one officer and one 97B as Phung Hoang Advisor and Deputy Advisor in the provinces of An Giang, Go Cong, Sa Dec, and Kien Tuong. Advisory personnel requirements are under continuous review, with a goal of total withdrawal NLT 1 July 1973.

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J. Resettlement and Refugee Support

1. The provincial Social Welfare Services (SWS) accomplished very little field work in the first months of 1970 as they cleaned up the fiscal dossiers from the heavy payments schedule of late 1969. Also there was the usual delay in the Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW) sending out funds. By February, An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen, Kien Giang, and Vinh Binh had begun actively paying benefits to refugees and war victims.
2. After the early 1970 corps-wide pause by GVN following the remarkable expansion into enemy territory throughout 1969, pacification efforts rose by March and reports of refugees Returning to Village (RTV) were reported in Kien Phong, Kien Hoa, Phong Dinh, Go Cong, Chau Doc, and Dinh Tuong.
3. Following the ousting of the Sihanouk Government in Cambodia in mid-March and reports of internal turbulence, several thousand Vietnamese nationals who had been living across the border moved over into Chau Doc and Kien Phong. There was no concern in MR4 as these peoples had long been moving back and forth across the border, and now merely moved in with relatives or friends for what was regarded as a temporary visit. Then with the 30 April Allied operation into the Cambodian sanctuaries of the VC/NVA, and an outbreak of anti-Vietnamese resentment by the Cambodian populace, a flood of VN repatriates moved to the safety of Vietnam.
4. In early May VN Navy convoys carrying supplies up-river to Phnom Penh began returning to MR4 loaded with repatriates. One convoy appeared at several villages in Kien Phong and dropped off 14,000 repatriates and another carried 9,043 people to Dong Tam Base near My Tho. Americans were seriously concerned that epidemics of cholera, typhoid, etc. would break out in the ships or camps jammed with repatriates. Fortunately no serious troubles occurred, and GVN and ARVN must be praised for their remarkable response to a major task. By August 130,000 repatriates had entered MR4, about 50% going through GVN camps, and the others finding their own shelter in the border areas.
5. The repatriate problem absorbed the complete attention for five mid-year months of MSW and SWS officials, and the regular refugee work suffered a setback. Further the unexpected drain on the Ministry of Social Welfare's budget, and aluminum roofing supply distorted all previous program plans. It was not until November and December that provincial SWS managed to regain momentum in paying benefits to the growing backlog of those eligible.

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6. In late 1970 GVN decided that the enemy sanctuary of the U Minh Forest had to be taken and held. The ARVN 21st Division began moving in from the three surrounding provinces. Early estimates on possible refugees were in the range of 10,000 to 15,000. The first problem area was on the north side of the forest, in Kien Giang Province but soon refugees appeared in Chuong Thien and An Xuyen Provinces. The Sd Ministry did not respond quickly, in line with its usual custom and only the fact of a bountiful rice harvest kept these refugees from hardship. By April 47,000 people had come out of the forest area, either fleeing the fighting or else forcibly evacuated. By April all had received temporary payments and in May the SWS began resettlement benefits to those who would not be able nor desire to return to their former homes, or RTV benefits to those who had been able after many years to return to their original villages.

7. As of 31 December 1970 the status of the two major refugee programs in MR4 was as follows:

Resettlement (at place of refuge)	
Full benefits paid	141,162 people
Benefits not fully paid yet	<u>27,714 people</u>
Total.....	168,876 people

Return To Village (RTV)	
Full benefits paid	240,261 people
Benefits not fully paid yet	<u>102,582 people</u>
Total	342,843 people

8. The year 1971 opened with provincial SWS engaged in preparation of dossiers on 1970 financial payments for submission to the Ministry. Further the SWS were fully involved in preparing for the 1971 plan. Thus no field work of registering refugees or effecting payment of benefits was accomplished. It was not until March that the SWS were able to surmount the customary GVN beginning-of-year obstacles and begin aiding the refugees. In general, the SWS were in 1971 showing quicker response to war victims incidents, in many instances effecting payments of cash and food benefits within one or two days. In April the Ministry began implementing steps long pressed by DRAC to improve performance. Fifty cadre were sent to critical problem provinces to give the understaffed SWS some added field capability. Then the Ministry instituted a series of study teams to visit the field and give expert advice to the SWS Chiefs on how to speed up their work. Further, since a chronic shortage of aluminum roofing has hampered the refugee payment program, it was decided by the US Mission and MSW to cease relying upon roofing in MR4, and to give cash in lieu of roofing. This measure, long advocated by DRAC was implemented in early May.

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9. In summary, there has been considerable improvement in the GVN refugee/war victims program. The SWS officials have improved their abilities and are generally more responsive to the problems they face. As momentum picks up during mid-year it is expected that the bulk of MR4 refugees will receive their full benefits by the end of CY 1971.

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SECTION III, PACIFICATION**A. Pacification Program**

1. The Accelerated Pacification Campaigns of 1968 and 1969 placed large areas of the Delta under government control. The HES of December 1969 reported a population of 5,911,502.

AB	ABC	DE	V
63.7%	87.1%	7.5%	5.4%

At that time 394 hamlets were rated V and 534 were rated DE.

2. The revised HES was implemented January 1, 1970. The changes, as reflected by the January, 1970 HES were: (for population)

AB	ABC	DE	V
60.1%	80.9%	14.1%	4.9%

In the first month of 1970, of the 4,205 hamlets in MR4, the HES rated 415 V and 774 DE.

3. Continued pacification progress was made during the first quarter of 1970. At the same time the enemy infiltrated the 95A and the 88th NVA regiments into the Delta. These regiments sustained heavy losses while infiltrating. The second quarter of 1970 began with increased enemy activity and ARVN cross-border operations into Cambodia. Due to removal of ARVN forces from support of the pacification program little pressure was placed on eradication of VC base areas in the Delta.

4. During the third quarter, the Cambodian effort diminished, and a new Corps commander was assigned who was interested in pacification. For the first time, the September HES showed over 90% of the Delta's population living in hamlets rated ABC. ARVN units began operations into enemy base areas, against enemy main force and local force units.

5. At the end of 1970 the HES reported a population of 6,281,863; this included 125,000 repatriates from Cambodia. The HES breakout for population security was:

AB	ABC	DE	V
81.1%	92.9%	6.8%	0.3%

The number of hamlets rated V was reduced to 61, while 473 were rated DE.

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6. November 1970 was the beginning of the Special Transition Campaign which continued through February 28, 1971. During this period the 21st ARVN Division entered the U Minh Forest in force. Throughout the Delta, Dong Khoi (saturation) operations began to deny the enemy sanctuary in his mini-base areas and inflict casualties. Outpost construction increased and territorial units were recruited in greater strength and deployed.

7. The HES was again administratively changed. Political control was given equal value with military control. Thus the reduction in AB ratings does not mean a change in the military situation. It is recognition of the importance of political control. HES ratings for February 1971 were:

AB	ABC	DE	V
65.5%	91.7%	8.2%	0.1%

14 of the 4227 Delta hamlets were rated V.

8. There has been continual progress in the pacification program since Tet of 1968. Relative security is now provided almost every inhabitant of the Delta. With increasing stability and security, the people are exhibiting growing interest in economic, social, and governmental development.

9. In response to the desires for accelerated economic development and to facilitate military movement, emphasis has been placed on improving roads, bridges, and canals.

10. The Delta has increased rice production since 1969 by 403,000 metric tons of paddy rice and now produces a surplus of more than 700,000 tons. There has been an increase in animal husbandry production and diversification of crops. Since the economy of the Delta is based on rice and other agriculture products, the inflationary trend of the general economy is beneficial to the peasant population.

11. The Social Welfare Service performed in a generally mediocre manner throughout 1970 except in the relocation of 125,000 repatriates from Cambodia. The refugees generated by ARVN operations in the U Minh (36,000) and in Tri Ton area (10,000) have been largely neglected by the Social Welfare Service. Although much remains to be accomplished, some significant progress has been made in 1971 as discussed in the previous section on Resettlement and Refugee Support.

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12. Impressive advances were made in the fields of Public Health and Education since December 1969. The number of hospital beds available in the Delta increased by 777. Elementary schools increased by 900 classrooms, 2,526 teachers, and 158,000 students. Construction in secondary education facilities provided for an additional 18,000 students. There were also developments in vocational and higher education.

13. The delta has 1.3 million hectares (85%) of land to be distributed by the GVN in the Land to the Tiller program. Although the new land reform law was not implemented until September 1970, by March 1971 about 180,000 hectares had been approved for distribution to the peasants working the land, and the momentum of the program was increasing.

14. Although the enemy population base for recruiting has been decimated by military operations, effective security, and a Chien Hoi program that averages about 1,700 Hoi Chanh per month, numerous Viet Cong political cadre have been able to remain undetected in hamlets controlled by the GVN.

15. Successful implementation of the Phung Hoang program and elimination of the VCI infrastructure remain the most serious problems in MR4. Upgrading the command structure, training, and discipline of the Territorial Forces of MR4 is crucial, as is improvement of the PSDF.

CONFIDENTIAL**SECTION IV, FORCES****A. Intelligence**

1. The well-coordinated collection, detailed analysis and rapid dissemination of intelligence at all levels from Corps to District will continue to be the key to the eventual destruction of the enemy combat, combat support, rear service elements and political infrastructure.

2. The combined efforts of territorial, para-military and ARVN reaction forces can only be as effective as the product of the intelligence community. As the level of US involvement in the operations and advisory effort diminishes, it becomes increasingly important for advisory personnel at District, Province, Division and Corps to exert maximum effort to prepare the Vietnamese to carry on an effective intelligence program.

3. Improvements have been made during the past 18 months in developing the organizational structure of the various collection agencies in the Delta. However, much remains to be done to improve the inter-agency coordination to produce even more accurate assessments of enemy intentions at all levels throughout the region.

4. Since January 1970, the enemy has suffered innumerable military and political setbacks. Events out-of-country have seriously affected his ability to resupply, causing him to revert to essentially a Phase I guerrilla conflict. He is now committed to wide-spread, but selective, terrorist activities; commitment of small, special purpose units to interdict lines of communication, both land and water; and harassments of outposts. He is also attempting to reconstitute his infrastructure in order to regain and maintain some political influence over the population.

5. With fragmentation of his forces, it becomes increasingly important for advisors at all levels to influence their counterparts to seek out information that can be used to pre-empt terrorist and harassment activities.

6. Of utmost importance is the accuracy of determining the enemy strength. The reassessment of enemy strengths and compilation of more accurate statistics has resulted in development of greater operational and intelligence confidence by field commanders and a greater willingness to meet and close with the enemy.

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7. Since October 1970, Province and District Dong Khoi saturation operations have proved to be the single most successful method to disrupt the enemy. The key to achieving maximum results is the constant development and use of timely and accurate information concerning enemy unit locations, caches, and base areas. The wide spread exploitation of Hoi Chanh's who accompany RF and PF units is a most meaningful technique. Lateral exchange of information between Districts and Provinces is also essential since VC units use GVN political and military boundaries to their advantage, knowing that reaction to their activities in the vicinity of boundaries is hindered because of the complications in coordinating cross-boundary actions.

8. To improve the overall advisory effort and to obtain maximum utilization of US personnel assigned to DRAC G2, an internal realignment of operational sections was implemented in January 1971. The Operations Advisory Element was created to provide a focal point for the advisory effort and at the same time, coordinate the US information collection, processing and dissemination program.

9. Formation of the Combined Intelligence Indications Order of Battle Section (CIIOB), brought together the functions and personnel of the former Joint Intelligence Center and the Order of Battle Section. The CIIOB serves as the central coordinating agency for intelligence analysis and dissemination. It is tasked with the responsibility to provide proper integration of all available intelligence reports from sources throughout the Delta.

10. The CIIOB produces weekly intelligence assessments on the enemy situation in MR4. These activities are in addition to a program of operational advisory assistance to the ARVN, G2 Staff. A phased program of physical integration has been implemented with the active participation of counterparts.

11. A second major realignment took place in February, combining airborne surveillance coordination activities with the unattended ground sensor program. Placing all electronic surveillance functions under one section will provide maximum utilization of trained personnel and use of available air assets. Of significance in the Vietnamization of intelligence/surveillance functions, is the rapid development of technical proficiency in unattended ground sensor programs by the Vietnamese. In January 1970, less than 50 trained Vietnamese were available to establish and monitor sensor fields with a total of 375 implanted sensors. Since that time, more than 200 school-trained operators have been assigned to monitoring

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teams in all three divisions and the 44th STZ. Additionally, special orientation courses have been conducted for senior officer personnel in Division G2 sections to insure that they have a working knowledge of sensor capabilities, limitations and methods of employment. Currently a level of 1,100 implanted sensors is being maintained throughout MR4.

12. The MR4 Combined Interrogation Center has directed continuing efforts toward production of quality interrogation reports. Since January 1970, the US and ARVN elements have produced over 400 interrogation reports which have greatly contributed to the MR4 intelligence effort.

13. Improvement in the enemy incident reporting system within DRAC/ARVN IV Corps has been noted. Presently a parallel reporting system is employed with both US and ARVN reports being funneled along separate TOC channels from District to Province, then to Division and subsequently to DRAC. Problem areas include language understanding, lack of aggressiveness in seeking all details of an incident under conditions of pressure and a tendency at certain lower ARVN levels to not report non-casualty producing incidents. In many cases, reports minimize the seriousness of incidents that might reflect unfavorably on either District or Provincial administrations.

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B. ARVN

1. In the past year there has been improvement in the overall performance of the three divisions. Most noteworthy has been the progress of the 7th Division which, in early 1970, was rated in the bottom quarter among the ARVN divisions. Steady improvement in operational effectiveness and quality of leadership have spurred the division's rise to its present position among ARVN's top divisions.

2. During the fourth quarter 1970, CIDG border camps were converted to mobile ranger battalions. They have assumed the mission of limited cross border operations as well as border camp defense. At least three ranger battalions have been committed continuously to the Seven Mountains campaign since November with excellent results.

3. In February 1971, division TAOR's were realigned to permit the 9th Division greater flexibility in conducting cross border operations. The incursions have the purpose of border denial and assisting Cambodia in opening and securing major lines of communication. The initial operation during the spring of 1970 disrupted the enemy's privileged border sanctuaries as well as bringing needed relief to the embattled Cambodian government. Other limited incursions since then have prevented the reestablishment of base areas. In January 1971, Operation Cuu Long 44/02 opened Highway #4, Cambodia's vital link to the sea, permitting the initial flow of needed supplies to Phnom Penh. However, very few supplies were moved from Kampong Som to Phnom Penh, and the enemy has again closed the road.

4. The 9th Division employs one regiment in securing the Mekong River for convoys. Relief of the 9th Division from operations in the Seven Mountains area will provide another regiment for possible border denial/LOC security. Further improvement in border denial operations may be the result of a study currently being completed within this headquarters. The 44th STZ has limited forces available and can therefore conduct only token cross border operations.

5. The establishment of the Support Operations Coordination Center (SOCC) at Chi Lang provides a means of control for employment of US Army helicopter gunships in Cambodia. The SOCC also serves as a combined liaison headquarters for FANK, ARVN and US representatives. Also the SOCC is a data bank for intelligence pertaining to cross border operations.

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6. A sharp increase in the number of sampans populating coastal fishing areas has created serious problems for naval forces implementing the sea blockade. Resources are stretched extremely thin in areas such as the coastal waters adjacent to the U Minh Forest. Consequently, there appears to be a considerable amount of enemy sea traffic reinforcing the elements in the U Minh Forest. The CG, IV Corps and MR4, has ordered tighter controls to be placed on fishing areas. He has directed that close coordination be established between naval authorities and the appropriate sectors; however, the problem remains a serious one.

7. A problem facing artillery units in the Delta is a lack of command supervision. Some battalions are deployed in as many as five provinces. Although this situation is improving, the problems, coupled with an inadequate road network, make command supervision extremely difficult. A second problem is the fact that only a small percentage of the fire support available in MR4 is being employed effectively and of this, the majority is provided by gunships. A major contributing factor to this situation is the lack of fire planning and fire support coordination in preparing for tactical operations. Qualified fire support coordinators are available, but are not used by the maneuver commanders. As the drawdown of US forces continues, ARVN and territorial forces will be experiencing a reduction in the fire support normally provided. This makes it even more imperative that commanders use their fire support coordinators and employ sound fire support planning and coordination techniques.

8. A potential problem area concerns the territorial artillery force structure in MR4. As established by JGS, the Corps Artillery Commander is responsible for the technical supervision of the territorial artillery forces through the Sector Artillery Commanders. This increases the span of control for the Corps Artillery Commander and creates a difficult command management situation. DRAC is currently working with ARVN IV Corps on a proposal which will reduce the artillery span of control to a manageable level and provide an effective command and control structure.

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C. US Army and VN Air Force

1. The 164th Combat Aviation Group is the only US unit under the operational control of DRAC directly involved in combat operations. The Group provides 75% of the combat aviation assets and accounts for 21% of the enemy killed throughout the Delta.

2. A highlight of the Vietnamization program has been the response by VNAF. The former US air bases at Binh Thuy and Soc Trang are now solely the responsibility of the Vietnamese. The MR4 Direct Air Support Center is operated by VNAF. Furthermore, virtually all high performance tactical air missions are flown by VNAF. Two additional VNAF helicopter squadrons and one more tactical fighter squadron have been formed. The technical proficiency of the personnel in these units is high due to the training received in the US and the on-the-job training offered by the 164th Combat Aviation Group. Programs such as the integration of US and VNAF helicopter crews has proven especially effective. In early 1970, VNAF flew two assault packages; now they have the capability of providing three packages daily. One overall deficiency remains: these units were initially augmented with highly trained US personnel. Once a satisfactory level of proficiency was attained, the US personnel were withdrawn. Shortly thereafter, these units were taxed to supply cadres for the activation of newly formed VNAF units in other MR's. The result has been a lack of personnel proficient in managerial skills such as maintenance and administrative supervisors. This deficiency remains a serious problem.

3. There is a lack of coordination between IV Corps and the 4th Air Division in the control of air assets. The lack of liaison between the two headquarters limits the Commanding General's flexibility in day-to-day coordination of VNAF aviation assets and planning for future operations.

4. The two US Medical Evacuation Detachments (Dustoff) are providing on-the-job training for selected VNAF pilots. Medevac missions throughout the Delta are flown with a US pilot and a Vietnamese copilot. The objective of this intensified training program is to pass all of the medevac responsibilities within MR4 to VNAF.

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5. The passing of command of Solid Anchor on 1 April 1971 to the Vietnamese marked the final phase of the Vietnamization of naval operations. US effort in this area is now essentially an advisory one. For ground units, the withdrawal of battalion combat assistance teams (BCAT) on 1 July 1971 denotes a shift in the advisory effort away from the battalions and focuses the effort at regimental and division level. In August 1971, a corresponding reduction in the territorial forces advisory teams will begin with the withdrawal of Mobile Assistance Teams (MAT), an indicator of the significant improvement that has occurred in the performance of the territorial forces.

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D. Regional Forces/Popular Forces

1. During the reporting period, the changing character of the war in MR4 necessitated a re-evaluation of the deployment, tactics and techniques of all Territorial Forces. A major factor in the re-evaluation was the Cambodian operation, in which the redeployment of ARVN forces took place. Regional Forces were required to assume many of the missions formerly assigned to Regular Forces. As a result Regional Force units are, with few exceptions, now being used in a mobile role, with Popular Forces assuming most of the static missions formerly assigned to the Regional Forces. In turn, some of the Popular Forces in the more secured areas have been replaced by PSDF, allowing the redeployment of Popular Forces to the less secure areas within villages.

2. Within the framework of this evaluation, it quickly became apparent that greater emphasis must be placed on certain tactics and techniques, i.e.: Dong Khol operation, cross border operations, safe haven (mini-base) elimination, cordon and search operations in conjunction with the police, with special emphasis on night operations.

3. As a result of this emphasis, a massive refresher training program for RF/PF forces was initiated with over 185 RF companies and 1151 PF platoons trained or in the process of being trained. This training program also included the implementation of a Night Operation and Ambush Training Program by Australian and American Teams, with major emphasis being placed on RF companies and PF platoons who have not been or are not scheduled for refresher training.

4. As a result of the successful redeployment of Territorial Forces and the success of current tactics and techniques, the enemy has been forced to scale down his unit size and to operate more during the hours of darkness. To combat this expected reaction, periodic night operations have been and are being carried out throughout the districts. To cite one example of the success this program is having, from 31 December 1970 through 1 February 1971, night operations accounted for more than 50% of the total enemy KIA in MR4.

5. The activities described above resulted in a decided weakening of the enemy's strength and contributed greatly toward the goal of total pacification of MR4.

6. The 581 RF Rifle Companies authorized as of January 1970 were increased by the addition of 44 RF Rifle Companies authorized in July 1970 bringing the total authorization for IV Corps and MR4 to its present 625 RF Rifle Companies.

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7. There were 2866 PF Platoons authorized in IV Corps and MR4, as of January 1970. Additional authorizations in July, August and September 1970 of 127, 126 and 40 PF Platoons respectively brought the total authorization to 3159 PF Platoons. In late September 1970, 296 PF Platoons were authorized by the reduction in strength from 35 to 32 men per platoon bringing the total PF Platoons authorized in IV Corps and MR4 to its present level of 3455.

8. The upgrading of the equipment in the hands of the RF/PF units continued to improve. During the reporting period, RF/PF units received 100% of their authorized M-16 rifles and increased to 90% of their TOE authorization for M-79 grenade launchers. RF units reached 100% of their M-60 machine guns in mid-1970. The upgrading to the PRC-25 radio continues to be slow due to a continued production lag in the United States. In this sixteen month period, the percentage of authorized PRC-25 radios versus those on hand increased from 49% to 60% for all RF/PF units. The PRC-10 continues to be used where the PRC-25 is not available.

9. 120 Mobile Advisory Teams are currently deployed in 15 of the 16 provinces in MR4. The primary mission of MATs continues to be in Village/Hamlet Security. Additional missions include combat assistance for RF Battalions and Lien Dois and for MATs to work with Vietnamese Mobile Training Teams and Night Operations Ambush Training Teams.

10. In 1970, the number of MATs deployed rose from 116 to 146 teams. The increase was to expand the advisory effort at the village level where it was believed the most progress could be made in upgrading territorial forces. Because of the success of the MATs working at village level, the number of teams deployed was reduced from 146 to 120. It is expected that MATs will complete their mission by the end of Calendar Year 1971.

11. Leadership development continues to be a problem among the territorial forces, but it has received much attention and command emphasis during the period covered by this report. The identification and training of potential leaders is the highest priority action in alleviating this problem. To accomplish this, sectors and subsectors have been directed to identify potential leaders, with the overriding consideration being demonstrated leadership potential under field combat conditions. In addition, maximum use of quotas for all leadership courses is directed.

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12. At the same time that potential leaders are identified and trained, ineffective leaders are recommended for elimination. Another action which is resulting in the improvement of leadership is the proper recognition of competent leaders. This is accomplished by the efficient and timely use of promotion quotas and the presentation of awards and decoration to deserving personnel. Shortage of leaders during Calendar Year 1970 averaged 16% for RF and 13% for PF but as a result of the discussed actions these shortages have now been substantially reduced to 4% and 5% respectively.

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a. As of this date the National Police strength in MR4 is 29,184. This figure represents an increase of over 9,000 since January of 1970. Much of this increase has been credited to an extremely successful recruiting campaign which ended in March of 1971. The NP in MR4 have a goal in 1971 to attain a strength of 34,000 police. All of these personnel have been recruited and many are now in the processing stage or are in training. Personnel presently being processed or in training are not reflected in the 29,184 figure mentioned above.

b. The National Police are now deployed to 726 villages in MR4. There is a total of 5,122 policemen assigned to the village stations. This figure compares with 529 villages and 4,031 personnel in January 1970. As the new recruits return from training the majority will be assigned to village police stations to fill existing vacancies.

2. Police Special Branch

a. The primary mission of the Police Special Branch is twofold; to protect the civilian sector against political or subversive threats from rebel domestic groups, and to lay the ground work for a future civilian counter-intelligence and security service. In performing this mission, the PSB is tasked with conducting clandestine intelligence operations in order to penetrate and neutralize the enemy political structure. An intensive training program, coupled with cumulative experience and close continuous support from US advisors, is gradually producing a small cadre of professional intelligence officers. This cadre is demonstrating increasing competence in the performance of the PSB mission, but its growth rate is restricted and hampered by the relatively low quality of new personnel assigned to PSB. Personnel mal-assignments and frequent misuse of the PSB by the National Police is also a problem area. These problems are recognized at higher echelons and successful efforts to alleviate them on the national level are being conducted.

3. Identity and Adequacy of Counter-Insurgency Training

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a. Initially US Army combat experienced non-commissioned officers were placed on 90-day temporary duty to establish an in-service training program for the National Police Field Force. The deployment of the NPFF to the district level made it advisable to retain these NCOs on a full-time basis as advisors. Consequently, COMUSMACV authorized one NCO to each province to continue the in-service training. There are currently 14 provinces that have military NCOs assigned to them. One province, due to pacification progress, has had the position of the NCO abolished. MR4 has continually filled all of the slots or quotas for the third country counter-insurgency courses conducted in Malaysia. To date there have been 18 redactors (company commanders and executive officers) who have attended this type of course.

b. The Phung Hoang school established in region headquarters has made good progress in its training of personnel in the elimination of the Viet Cong infrastructure. The National Police provide 60% of the student input. Continued class improvement has been emphasized since its inception in order to make the student aware of current and relevant information.

4. Problem Areas

a. Mid-level leadership for the National Police continues to be poor. The promotion system is still based strictly on merit and this has a two-fold adverse effect: subordinates are not provided with sufficient incentive to do their best, and those promoted are generally not the most deserving.

b. In March of 1971, MG Tran Thanh Phong took over leadership of the National Police in Vietnam. Under his leadership, radical changes are taking place within the National Police structure. The Director General of the National Police has been changed to Commanding General, National Police Forces. The Police have now been placed on the same level as the military forces. We can expect to see major changes in the promotion system, mid-level training for selected personnel, and National Police pay and allowance.

c. There is apprehension among some of the district and village chiefs due to notification that selected ARVN officers are being assigned to the National Police to take over these positions as well as others in the country. The feeling exists that as long as they are going to be replaced, why should they continue to put their best efforts forward. A constant reminder has been given to them that as long as they are doing the job in a professional manner -- the best they can -- they will not be replaced.

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d. The National Identification Registration Program. In January of 1970, 14% of the NIRP goal had been reached. As of this date 77% of the goal of 3,963,248 had been reached. It is anticipated that the program will reach completion by June of 1971. The current backlog of ID cards at the province level is rapidly being diminished due to the constant pressure of the regional Director of National Police not only to reduce the backlog but to increase the image of the National Police by having them personally deliver finished identification cards to the populace in the villages and hamlets. This has been the major obstacle faced by the police and it appears to be successfully resolved.

5. Military Conversion to Police

a. To date there have been 9,739 recruits from ARVN sources inducted into the National Police. There was no problem in the recruitment of these personnel as the manpower source was constantly available. In the latter part of 1970, recruitment was again opened for the National Police, and again there were no difficulties encountered in military applications for the National Police.

b. Notification has been received that 2,500 ARVN officers and senior NCOs will be assigned to the National Police. This eventual transfer will greatly assist the National Police at the district and village level where these trained personnel will be assigned as the chiefs of police. It is anticipated that there will be problems encountered in this movement, but the general feeling is that it will be more of an asset than a liability.

6. Training Other Than Counterinsurgency

a. During 1969 there were only six courses consisting of 28 classes, conducted by the National Police at region level. By the end of 1970, classes had doubled, with 12 courses and 66 classes. The student participation had more than doubled, with class attendance numbering more than 2,400. In 1971 the regional training center will train more than 4,500 National Policemen. Training facilities are still temporarily colocated within the detention facility located within the National Police compound. During the latter part of 1970, construction was started on the regional training center. This facility will be completed by mid-May of 1971. Upon completion, the center will be able to train up to 450 students at any one time in 12 classrooms.

b. Each province has a full-time training officer assigned to it. All village policemen must be trained by 31 December 1971 in a minimum one-week course of instruction. In addition, the training officer will conduct training for other police officers in the provinces as required. At this time the level of instruction and the quality of the

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material presented are the best that can be obtained under existing conditions. There obviously is a definite need for improvement in all fields of training and emphasis will be placed on this in the future. A training aids center has been set up at the region level to support the training center, and a large library of Vietnamese language training films has been obtained. Equipment to dub Vietnamese language on additional films has been secured and a man is presently undergoing training in its use.

7. National Police Field Force

a. The National Police Field Force SOP of March 1969 authorized the type of missions that the NPFF may be assigned. Initial reports indicate improper utilization of the NPFF. Therefore, Vietnamese language copies of this SOP were made available to all province and district police chiefs. Subsequent reports now indicate proper but under-utilization of the NPFF. In accordance with the NPFF Table of Organization, one company has been assigned to each of the 16 provinces and 93 platoons are assigned to 93 of the 94 districts. Due to personnel shortages, An Xuyen Province lacks one platoon for district assignment. The deployment of the platoons to district assignment imposed additional leadership and administrative problems on both the company commanders and the platoon leaders. To upgrade these units, the following steps were taken:

(1) A one-month retraining program was started in Da Lat NPFF Training Center. As of this date 71 of the 93 platoons have completed their retraining. There are currently nine in training and 13 are scheduled to begin.

(2) All company commanders and executive officers have attended the Thu Duc ARVN company officers training course.

(3) Platoon leaders are currently attending the ARVN platoon leaders course conducted at Nha Trang.

(4) All company commanders and executive officers have attended the Ministry of Interior management course.

b. The National Police Field Force construction program has completed 15 of the 16 compounds and 71 of the 93 districts compounds. Construction was halted for a time due to the lack of roofing, but a limited amount of roofing was procured to complete the remaining company compound and to erect housing units where the NPFF housing is critical.

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8. Marine Police

a. The Marine Police now have a total of six bases and nine sub-bases operating in 14 of the 16 provinces. Additional bases are planned this year for Bac Lieu, An Xuyen and Kien Giang. There are two permanent large bases in My Tho and Can Tho, the latter scheduled for completion in May 1971. This facility will be able to accomplish major overhauls on any of the Marine Police boats.

b. A problem also exists in the middle management leadership of the Marine Police. This is caused in part by the lack of a career ladder whereby the Marine Police can advance through the ranks. The advisory personnel and the Marine Police commander recognize this and have instituted training in which 25 redactors from the Marine Police are undergoing training in the United States at the US Coast Guard Training Center in Virginia. There are 37 other officers undergoing training in Saigon to become boat captains and section leaders. In addition, plans are underway to organize a Marine Police training section within the MR4 Training Center.

9. Inspection, Internal Security and Narcotics

a. Inspections. Frequency and thoroughness of inspection teams were increased considerably through 1970. They inspected and re-inspected 94 district stations 164 times; of the sub-stations they conducted 621 inspections. Each of the 16 province headquarters stations was inspected twice by DGNP inspection teams. Since these teams report on a semester basis, reports have not yet reached this office. In December 1970, a new PSD advisory effort was initiated in MR4; regional inspection teams will continue and conduct more periodic, unannounced inspections of police units with emphasis on all NP efforts at province, district and sub-district stations.

b. Internal Security. In 1970 this service investigated ten cases of corruption, 153 cases of misconduct, and two cases of VC agents within NP ranks, which resulted in the following: ten policemen prosecuted; 153 received disciplinary action; two were sent to prison. As inspections bring attention to corrupt, weak and inefficient personnel, investigation will be made to determine if charges are proven factual and disciplinary action and/or prosecution will be recommended against them.

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c. Narcotics. MR4 is authorized 85 narcotics officers. To date 72 have been trained in country, but only 63 are assigned; the remaining nine men have been transferred to other units. There is one team in each province and one at MR4 headquarters; strengths vary from three to seven men. To date these units have accounted for the destruction of over 133,146 cultivated marijuana plants, the seizure of over 636 pounds of bulk marijuana, 137 vials of heroin, and over four pounds of opium. Additionally, nearly 400 persons were arrested for various narcotics violations. Until December 1970 this program within the National Police was in a semi-dormant state, when new emphasis was placed on the program. MACV Directive 190-4 established the Drug Abuse Suppression Program, with combined anti-narcotic enforcement committees in each region. Also at each region is the Joint Narcotics Investigation Detachment (JNID). MACV 190-4 did not provide for logistical support for the team; this omission caused them to be without benefit of housing, vehicles, office facilities and equipment. Consequently, success to date has been hampered. JNID's activities have thus far been limited to intelligence gathering, and it is now believed that information is on hand on four of the major suppliers of narcotics in MR4, plus an abundance of facts concerning the locations of numerous small operations. As soon as this information has been properly evaluated, significant joint arrests and/or seizures will be made.

10. Telecommunications

a. The expansion of the Village-Hamlet Radio System was completed in early 1970 bringing the total number of radios in the Delta to 10,000. Approximately 900 mis-employed VHRS radios were identified and redistributed to authorized users. High-powered transmitters were installed in Chau Doc, Rach Gia, and Ca Mau. These were instrumental in the successful carrying of election returns without delay during the past year.

b. National Police have voice communications with all provinces except An Xuyen. The National Police have HF CW communications with all provinces, plus teletype to Saigon.

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F. Logistical Support

1. The Vietnamese logistical system is responsive to operational requirements. The equipment modernization program has continued and is largely completed except for Radio Sets, AN/PRC-25 and to a lesser degree in tactical vehicles. Other shortages in the modernization program are limited to replacement items rather than new input items.

2. The provision of an adequate road network continues to be vital factor in the pacification and development of Military Region 4. The US 34th Engineer Group, in general support of DRAC has devoted the efforts of its four construction battalions primarily to LOC construction with the mission of upgrading national and interprovincial highways QL4N, QL4S, and LTL's 9, 10, 24 and 31. Also, the ARVN 7th and 40th Engineer Groups and CPAF contractor BMK-BRJ are engaged in LOC construction.

3. The development and maintenance of the important secondary road network remains the primary responsibility of the civilian governmental Ministry of Public Works. Because of shortages in manpower, equipment, and materials, and due to operational requirements for ARVN, they are supplemented by the ARVN 40th Combat Engineer Group. While much progress has been made in opening, maintaining, and upgrading the secondary road network, a need still exists to streamline the cumbersome GVN administrative and fiscal procedures so as to permit proper planning and programming of scarce resources.

4. The manpower resources of the Province Public Works Department have been depleted by conscription and by the competition of contractors. This manpower shortage and a shortage of construction equipment have reduced the Province's capability to open and upgrade secondary roads and to maintain all roads, primary and secondary. In an effort to provide both long and short range solutions to this problem, IV Corps has directed that each province organize a RF Road Repair Company from existing RF forces. These units are being trained by US Army and SeaBee Engineer units in road maintenance and equipment operation techniques. The units have been equipped with pioneer tools obtained from excess USARV stock. Construction equipment to supplement the Province Public Works organization will be obtained through USAID sources, however, delays in actual issue of up to 8 months are expected as this program has second priority to an initial issue of new equipment to all provinces in RVN. The RF Road Repair Company will provide a source of trained manpower to the Province Public Works Department. Although presently equipped with only pioneer tools, significant progress can be made on maintenance and repair of roads.

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5. A program has been established to provide maintenance and repair of airfields in MR4, and priorities have been determined for the upgrading of six of the fields. Projects to upgrade Can Tho and Vinh Long Airfields are nearing completion, the projects for Moc Hoa, Vi Thanh, Ca Mau and Chi Lang have been programmed. The provision of asphalt concrete runways at these locations is vital for all season operations and to bring maintenance requirements more in line with VN capabilities.

6. A program to reduce US land holdings, leases, and land use has been successfully instituted. The program has resulted in savings to the US Government of nearly \$100,000 during the period of this report. As redeployment and draw down of US forces continues, tight controls will have to be maintained to insure efficient utilization of real estate.

7. Concurrently with the VNAF Dustoff training the Medical Regulating Officer for the 74th Medical Group is receiving QJT in operational center operations to facilitate the development of a functional ARVN Medical Regulating System to be incorporated into the overall Vietnamese Medical Evacuation System. In January 1970 the ARVN Surgeon General established a Department of Nursing in the ARVN Hospitals similar to that in US Army Hospitals. This large operation was supported by the Nursing Advisor who organized QJT programs for the Corpsmen at the 3rd Surgical Hospital. The program produced approximately 35 Corpsmen trained in Anesthesia, Operating Room Technique and Physical Therapy.

8. One of the problems in the "Vietnamization" process is the turning over of American Hospital Facilities. The difficulty is that the hospitals contain large amounts of sophisticated equipment for which the Vietnamese lack proper training. In this regard an action that will have far reaching impact is the establishment of the 4th Convalescent Center as an independent operating unit within the 3rd Surgical Hospital. The ARVN has its own physicians and nurses working on 4 separate Vietnamese wards. Of even greater importance, VN technicians work in X-Ray, Laboratory, Physical Therapy, etc. and are becoming familiar with the equipment. It is planned that the 3rd Surgical Hospital will be turned over to the Vietnamese so that, when the time for complete transfer comes the VN will be thoroughly familiar with all the equipment in the hospital. Presently the 4th Convalescent Center is the only Vietnamese unit functioning in and using the facilities of an American Hospital.

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9. Little progress has been made in turnover of US operated stagefields for helicopter refuel and rearming. Simply stated, stagefields are turned over to RVNAF only after they become excess to US operational needs. Once turned over to RVNAF, only minimal support for US forces can be expected. The turnover is controlled by JGS in coordination with MACV. Within IV Corps, we are attempting to have ARVN staff and operate the stagefields while the US supplies the assets.

10. A major weakness in the supply system is the reluctance to take prompt follow-up action to determine supply status. The requisitioner appears to be satisfied that his mission is accomplished once he submits his requisition. To offset this attitude, a built-in requirement for periodic reconciliations is desirable.

11. Battlefield recovery of combat losses, particularly of tracked vehicles, requires considerable emphasis. Common practice is to tow the vehicle from the field to the appropriate maintenance facility. This has resulted in additional extensive damage to road wheels as well as the road surface. Road wheels can normally be repaired if not damaged beyond rehabilitation tolerances.

12. Maintenance of the VRC-12 series of radios remains a major problem area. Repair modules are in short supply necessitating long down times.

13. Utilization of wheeled vehicles for cargo movement continues to be poor. Not uncommon is a convoy being dispatched (empty) to a location for a troop haul, another convoy a few hours later for a cargo haul, both convoys to return empty, while still a third is dispatched for retrograde.

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